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This article aims to explain why and how cross-cultural deal mediation
can be established as a new and effective Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) method for international business transactions. This article aims to
explain: the difference between deal mediation and cross-cultural deal me-
diation; how cross-cultural deal mediation works; the cross-cultural deal
mediator's role; and the benefits and potential problems associated with
cross-cultural deal mediation. This article promotes the intervention of a
cross-cultural deal mediator in the pre-contractual phase (contract forma-
tion) or bargaining phase of international business transactions to help the
parties to improve their mutual cross-cultural understanding to reach mu-
tually satisfactory agreements. This article makes theoretical arguments in
favor of cross-cultural deal mediation, but also presents empirical justifica-
tions on the basis of the developed and well-tested cross-cultural models of
Geert Hofstede's Five Cultural Dimensions, and Trompenaars and
Hampden-Turner's Seven Cultural Dimensions. Overall, this article pro-
motes the intervention of a cross-cultural deal mediator to assist parties
from different cultures in the negotiating and drafting processes of their
international business contracts to create more efficient and durable cross-
cultural business relationships.
I. INTRODUCTION
Y" OU don't get what you deserve, you get what you negoti-
ate" is a well-known saying amongst negotiators. Following
... this logic, bad negotiators will usually reach bad deals that
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inevitably lead to bad contracts. This leads a negotiator to consider
whether a mediator could be helpful in cross-cultural deals,' just as they
are in cross-cultural disputes. 2 American businesspeople and lawyers are
often wrongly assumed to be skilled negotiators. 3 After all, to become a
successful businessperson or lawyer in a competitive masculine society
like that of the United States, it is a well-known and well-evidenced fact
that a person must be smart, tough, and-to some extent-have a big
ego.4 In a competitive masculine society like the United States, it is more
1. L. Michael Hager & Robert Pritchard, Deal Mediation: How ADR Techniques Can
Help Achieve Durable Agreements in the Global Markets, ICSID Ri-v. FOREIGN
INVEiS'rMENT L.J., 2-3 (1999) (proposing a role for lawyer-mediators in interna-
tional transactions, particularly if cultural differences exist); see also Scott R. Pep-
pet, Contract Formation in Imperfect Markets: Should We Use Mediators In Deals?,
19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RI'SOL. 283, 288-90 (2004) (presenting a complete over-
view of the theoretical arguments and empirical evidences in favor of deal media-
tion in U.S. deal-making and negotiations. However, this article does not present
the theoretical arguments and empirical evidences in favor of deal mediation for
cross-cultural transactions); Daniel Q. Posin, Mediating International Business Dis-
putes, 9 FORDAM J. CoRiP. & FIN. L. 449, 450 (2004) (discussing "the overlay of
additional problems that international mediation presents," and discussing "partic-
ular mediation tactics-including playing the 'culture card'-that can be em-
ployed to overcome cultural problems in international business mediations").
2. John Barkai, What's a Cross-Cultural Mediator To Do? A Low-Context Solution
for a High-Context Problem, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFL-Icr RI-soL. 43, 43-44 (2008)
(discussing the role of a mediator in cross-cultural commercial mediations).
3. See Peppet, supra note 1, at 361-62 (discussing the barrier to entry to deal media-
tion called "Optimistic Overconfidence." This barrier is evidence by research
showing that "negotiators tend to be overconfident in their own assessments, pre-
dictions, and abilities and that they tend to be overly optimistic about their chances
of success in their endeavors"); see also Robert S. Rendell, Making Global Deals:
Negotiating in the International Marketplace, 47 Bus. LAW. 361 (1991) 361-62 (dis-
cussing the book review of Making Global Deals by Jeswald W. Salacuse that seeks
to guide the general practitioner for international business negotiations. Robert S.
Rendell explains that this book provides valuable information "because most law-
yers do not make good negotiators." He states that "they are trained in the skills
of legal research, analysis, drafting and argumentation. And these skills do not
necessarily prepare one to be a successful negotiator of a business deal. This is
particularly true in the case of international negotiations. When dealing with for-
eign parties, the United States lawyer will face problems and situations not previ-
ously encountered in a domestic setting."); Victor Fleischer, Deals: Bringing
Corporate Transactions into the Law School Classroom, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L.
RE v. 475, 475-97 (2002) (proposing the new educational approach adopted at Co-
lumbia Law School to teach transactional business law. This article explains that
most American law schools teach transactional business law and corporate deal-
making through the conventional "Karate Kid Method." This method teaches
courage and discipline, but "seems foolish to expect a young Karate student (or
law student) to go out and compete in a tournament without first bloodying his
nose in the practice ring." In other words, this article argues that traditional and
conventional methods of teaching in American law schools don't teach law stu-
dents to become successful transactional business lawyer with great negotiating
and deal-making skills and competencies).
4. GEERT HOFSTEDE, GERT JAN HoIs'TDE & MICHAEL MINKOV, CULTURES AN1)
ORGANIZATIONS, SOIrWARE OF TI-I MIND: INTERCULTURAL COOPERATION AND
ITS IMPORTANCE FOR SURVIVAL 135-87 (3d ed. 2010) (evidencing by empirical
data that masculine societies and business cultures, like in the United States, are
defined by general societal norms such as challenge, earnings, recognition, ad-
vancement, competition, praise for excellence, failing at work is a disaster, per-
formance means ego-boosting, etc.).
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difficult to understand why a negotiator would candidly admit that he
needs assistance from a deal mediator to help him to negotiate a deal.5
From my practical experience, I think this could be viewed as the first
major obstacle to selling the idea of deal mediation and cross-cultural
deal mediation to American businesspeople and lawyers. But the con-
cept of cross-cultural deal mediation might be more readily accepted by
American businesspeople and lawyers practicing international business. I
am offering this proposal because most experienced international busi-
ness negotiators realize that someone might be a great negotiator within
his own national culture, with his own people, but could be a poor or
average negotiator with foreign counterparts from different cultures.6
Operating in a new economic, cultural, legal, and political environment,
there are great challenges facing the international business negotiator. 7
Dealing with cultural differences remains the single most challenging task
for the international business negotiator.8
To illustrate the challenges of international business negotiations to my
students, I often use the Olympics as an analogy.9 I explain that Olympi-
ans are all top athletes and national champions, but only a select few will
become Olympian medalists. The level of competition and talent in-
creases and reaches its apogee at the Olympics. Similarly, for an Ameri-
can or Chinese negotiator, negotiating and closing deals at home might
5. Id. at 123. (discussing that in masculine societies business people and lawyers (es-
pecially men) should be assertive, ambitious and thorough). Therefore, an Ameri-
can lawyer may fear a negative reaction from his client to propose that a third-
party lawyer-mediator assist the negotiation process.
6. Jeswal W. Salacuse, Ten Ways that Culture Affects Negotiating Style: Some Survey
Results, 14 NE-GOTIATION J. 221, 221-25 (explaining research report on ten ways
that culture affects negotiating style. In a survey of 310 persons from twelve coun-
tries and eight occupations, the author asked participants to rate their negotiating
style covering ten negotiation process factors on basis of ten negotiation factors.
The countries that were represented in the survey were Spain, France, Brazil, Ja-
pan, the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Nigeria, Argentina, China,
Mexico, and India. The occupational specialties included law, military, engineer-
ing, diplomacy/public sector, students, accounting, teaching, and management/mar-
keting. Overall, the research shows that culture has a profound impact on
negotiations and profoundly influences how people think, communicate and be-
have. The author states, "[t]he great diversity of the world's cultures makes it
impossible for any negotiator, no matter how skilled and experienced, to under-
stand fully all the cultures.").
7. CLAUDE CELLICII & SUBIASH C. JAIN, GLOBAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS: A
PRACICAL GUIDE, 4-13 (2004) (presenting an overview of challenges that an in-
ternational business negotiator is facing in the global business environment).
8. FoNs TROMPENAARS & CHARLES HAMPDEN-TURNER, RIDING THIE WAVES OF
CULTURE: UNDERSTANDING CuiruAi DIVERSITY IN GI-03AL BUSINESS 20-24
(2d ed. 1998) (discussing that there is limited debate in the scholarship related to
international business that the single most influential factor is culture).
9. The author has taught international business negotiations in French and English
since 2005 at the MBA and EMBA programs at the University of Ottawa's Telfer
School of Management from a strategic, cultural, legal, and ethical perspective.
The author was the youngest professor to ever teach at the MBA program at the
age of twenty-eight years old. The author has also taught organizational behavior
and cross-cultural management at the undergraduate level of the Telfer School of
Management since 2006.
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be a simpler task than doing so abroad. If negotiation is often metaphori-
cally defined in literature in terms of games, war, and fighting, 10 then
these metaphors lead us to remember the conventional belief of the
"home-field advantage." Therefore, what is the solution for international
businesspeople: to stay at home? This solution might sound impractica-
ble and impossible, given the importance of globalization in today's busi-
ness world. Nonetheless, facing the high failure rate of international
strategic alliances (research shows that international joint ventures failed
at the rate of 50 percent" and that cross-border M&As failed at a rate of
83 percent), 12 the existing literature suggests that acquisitions be confined
to organizations with similar cultures.' 3 But regardless of the perceived
similarity between venturing/merging organizations, cultural misalign-
ments will always exist.1 4 Culture is defined by the pioneer Geert Hof-
stede as "software of the mind. 1 5 Culture is complex and has multi-
facets and multi-layer levels of influence on negotiators' behaviors.' 6 For
10. Mark Young & Erik Schlie, The Rhythm of the Deal: Negotiation as a Dance, 27
NEGOT!ATION J. 191, 191-203 (2011) (discussing "[i]n all the literature on the the-
ory and practice of negotiation, the governing metaphors have been games, war,
and fighting." Arguing "[t]his is true not only for tactical schools of power-based
negotiation but even for more constructive, interest-based approaches .... This
article explores the possible consequences of abandoning" these metaphors in
favor of a metaphor of dance).
11. Seung Ho Park & Gerardo R. Ungson, The Effect of National Culture, Organiza-
tional Complementarity, and Economic Motivation on Joint Venture Dissolution, 40
ACAD. MGMT. J. 279, 279 (1997).
12. John Bing, Gene Gitelson & Lionel Laroche, Culture Shock, CMA MGM'r., March
2001, at 40-41, available at http://itapintl.com/facultyandresources/articlelibrary
main/the-impact-of-culture-on-mergers-a-acquisitions.htm (affirming that 83 per-
cent of all mergers and acquisitions failed to produce positive outcomes and half of
them destroyed the value. Moreover that according to the "interviews of over 100
senior executives involved in these 700 deals over a two-year period revealed that
the overwhelming cause for failure is the people and the cultural differences.").
13. David M. Schweiger & Philip K. Goulet, Facilitating Acquisition Integration
Through Deep-Level Cultural Learning Interventions: A Longitudinal Field Experi-
ment, 26 ORG. SruD. 1477, 1478-85 (2005) (presenting the concept of Deep-level
cultural learning (DCL) interventions to mitigate risk of cultural clashes between
organizations and people involved in cross-border/cross-cultural strategic
alliances).
14. Id. at 1478 (theorizing on the complexity of cross-border mergers and
acquisitions).
15. HOFSTEDE 1r AL., supra note 4, at 5 (using the analogy "software of the mind" as
the way computers are programmed, culture is based on learned behaviors and
enables patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting mental programs).
16. TROMPENAARS & HAMPOIEN-TURNER, supra note 8, at 20-24 (theorizing that cul-
ture can be defined in three layers: first layer of culture (the outer layer: explicit
products ("[e]xplicit culture is the observable reality of the language, food, build-
ings, houses, monuments, agriculture, shrines, markets, fashions, and art"); second
layer of culture (the middle layer: norms and values) ("while the norms, con-
sciously or subconsciously, give us a feeling of 'this is how I normally should be-
have,' values give us a feeling of 'this is how I aspire or desire to behave."' A
norm serves as a criterion to determine what is "right or wrong," whereas a "value
serves as a criterion to determine a choice from existing alternatives."); third layer
of culture (the core: assumptions about existence ("[t]o answer questions about
basic differences in values between cultures it is necessary to go back to the core of
human existence.") The core assumption is that "the most basic value people
strive for is survival. Historically, and presently, we have witnessed civilizations
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instance, if national culture is the first influence to consider, organiza-
tional culture (or corporate culture) and professional culture (e.g., law-
yer, accountant, or engineer) also have a great influence on a negotiator's
behavior.17 As a result, the concept of culture is often analogically illus-
trated with an iceberg because it runs deep and the visible portion is only
a small piece of a much deeper thing which may not be easily visible.' 8
Following the theory that cross-border strategic alliances should be
confined to organizations with similar cultures, many will assume, for in-
stance, that Canadians and Americans share very similar cultures and are
such very compatible for a forming cross-border alliances. But theoreti-
cal and empirical studies demonstrate that these two cultures share not
only many similarities, but also many fundamental cross-cultural differ-
ences. 19 Therefore, there are always cross-cultural differences at play
that can affect international business transactions. Even though wise in-
ternational negotiators must "weigh culture against other important fac-
tors,' 20 national culture always remains the first and single most
influential factor on international business negotiations. 21 This does not
mean that national culture should be the only factor taken into considera-
tion; such a narrow focus can lead to the pitfalls of over-generalizations. 22
However, if ignored, cross-cultural differences between the parties can
become a source of conflict at the bargaining stage or later when the rela-
tionship is established and the contract has been signed. Consequently, I
argue that unlike financial, political, and legal risks, cultural risks associ-
ated with international business transactions are too often overlooked
and underestimated by lawyers and the contracting parties.
This article advocates for a preventive legal risk-management approach
by allowing a cross-cultural deal mediator to assist the parties in improv-
ing their cross-cultural understanding during the bargaining stage in order
fighting daily with nature: the Dutch with rising water; the Swiss with mountains
and avalanches; the Central Americans and Africans with droughts, and the Siberi-
ans (and Canadians!) with bitter cold.")).
17. HO1STEIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 11 (theorizing that mental programming corre-
sponds to different levels of cultures such as a person social class level, associated
with educational background and profession).
18. TROMPENAARS & HAMPDEN-TURNER, supra note 8, at 24.
19. Nancy J. Adler & John L. Graham, Business Negotiations: Canadians Are Not Just
Like Americans, 4 CAN. J. ADMIN. Sci. 211, 211-58 (1987) (this empirical study
based laboratory buyer-seller negotiation simulations investigated the determi-
nants of business negotiations between business people from the United States and
business people from Canada (i.e., Francophone and Anglophone Canadians).
The Francophone Canadians' negotiation style was found to be significantly differ-
ent from that of both the Americans and the Anglophone Canadians. The Ameri-
cans and the Anglophone Canadians also presented some cultural differences.).
20. HARVARD LAW Scii. PROGRAM ON NEGOTIATION, INFERNATIONAL NEGOTIA-
TIONS: CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATIONS SKILLS FOR INTERNATIONAL BusI
NESS EXEcurivEs 2 (2010) (discussing effective cross-cultural communications and
negotiations), available at http://www.pon.harvard.edu/freemium/international-ne
gotiations-cross-cultural-communication-skills- for-in ternational-business-execu
tives/.
21. TROMPNAARS & HAMPDEN-TURNER, supra note 8, at 21.
22. Id. at 20.
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to mitigate the cultural risks. After all, the bargaining of the contract
represents the creation of the business relationship. Why take the risk to
start the relationship on the wrong foot? Why wait for a dispute to arise
after the contract has been signed? Why not tackle the existing or poten-
tial cross-cultural issues in a preventive manner? If these contracts can
be metaphorically defined as a "corporate marriage" between two foreign
parties, I would like to introduce cross-cultural deal mediation as premar-
ital counseling for an intercultural or interracial couple.23 Premarital
counseling makes sense because, "the best divorce is the one you get
before you get married!" 24 If a cross-cultural strategic alliance is like an
intercultural or interracial union, from my experience as a child of an
intercultural and interracial union,25 differences may be a source of hap-
piness and pride. But this does not mean that they will not face chal-
lenges. Some people even from their respective culture and ethnicity or
family and friends may not approve of the intercultural and/or interracial
union.26 Most importantly, it is proven that children from intercultural or
23. See Charles T. Hill, Zick Rubin & Letitia Anne Peplau, Breakups Before Marriage:
The End of 103 Affairs, 32 J. Soc. IssuEs 147 (1976) (discussing "[f]actors that
predicted breakups before marriage, investigated as part of a two-year study of
dating relationships among college students, [which] included unequal involve-
ment in the relationship (as suggested by exchange theory) and discrepant age,
educational aspirations, intelligence, and physical attractiveness (as suggested by
filtering models). The timing of breakups was highly related to the school calen-
dar, pointing to the importance of external factors in structuring breakups. The
desire to break up was seldom mutual; women were more likely than men to per-
ceive problems in premarital relationships and somewhat more likely to be the
ones to precipitate the breakups. Findings are discussed in terms of their rele-
vance for the process of mate selection and their implications for marital
breakup").
24. Id. at 147.
25. My mother is a Caucasian French-Canadian (Qu6b6coise) and my father is black,
from Haiti. My opinion is also based on the self-observation of Fons Trompenaars,
who concluded that his natural cultural sensitivity emerged from his bicultural
background (i.e., French mother and Dutch father). Fons Trompenaars,
TR.OMPENAARS HAMPDEN-TuRNE-R1 CONSULTING, http://www2.thtconsulting.com/
about/people/fons-trompenaars/ (last visited May 6, 2014). Fons Trompenaars is
one of the most respected and cited authors on cross-cultural management in the
academic world. Fons Trompenaars is highly respected by the international busi-
ness community and was listed in the 2001, 2003, 2005, 2011, and 2013 prestigious
top Thinkers50 listing. The Thinkers50 Ranking 2013, TInNKERS50, http://www
.thinkers50.com/t50-ranking/2013-2/ (last visited May 6, 2014). I will refer to his
cross-cultural theory and research extensively in this article.
26. Kyle D. Killian, Reconstituting Racial Histories and Identities: The Narratives of
Interracial Couples, 27 J. MARITAL & FAM. THERAPY 27, 27-42 (2001) (discussing
"the process by which interracial spouses construct narratives about their racial
histories, identities, and experiences in their relationship together. Ten black-
white couples were interviewed individually and conjointly. The results reflected
interracial spouses' experience of their life together their perception of others' per-
ceptions of them, and their unique processes of negotiating racial, gender and class
differences. Black spouses, compared with white spouses, demonstrated a greater
awareness of and sensitivity to social resistance to interracial couples, and black
spouses' familial and personal histories were sometimes relegated to silence in the
couple relationship." This article discusses "recommendations for marriage and
family therapists working with interracial spouses."); see generally Sonia Nourin
Shah-Kazemi, Cross-Cultural Mediation: a Critical View of the Dynamics of Cul-
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interracial unions may face an identity crisis.27 Therefore, it is important
to keep in mind that a cross-cultural strategic alliance is like an intercul-
tural and interracial corporate marriage requiring special attention.
Furthermore, Samuel Huntington argues that all cultures around the
world tend to have some racist or ethnocentric propensities in cross-bor-
der conflicts. 28 Therefore, a cross-cultural deal mediator may also help
parties to moderate racism or/and ethnocentrism in cross-cultural
disputes.
In summary, international transactional lawyers negotiate on behalf of
their clients when making deals and resolving disputes on almost a daily
basis. International businesspeople and lawyers spend, on average, more
than 50 percent of their time in formal and informal negotiations.
29
Therefore, negotiating effectively cross-culturally is one of the single
most important skills to have in the increasingly "globalized" world.
"Global negotiations contain all of the complexity of domestic negotia-
tions, with the added dimension of cultural diversity."' 30 Why not seek
the help of a professional if needed when the stakes at play in interna-
tional deals are usually greater? I will argue that businesspeople and law-
yers are usually like men in romantic relationships; they prefer to wait for
their relationship to be on the verge of breaking up before considering
the idea of marriage counseling. Despite being a macho generalization,
this statement is evidenced in psychology researches.3 1 I also purposely
ture in Family Disputes, 14 INT'L J.L., POi'Y & FAM. 302 (2000) (supporting cross-
cultural mediation for family disputes and discussing the use of cross-cultural me-
diation in cross-cultural family disputes. In other words, this article "argues that
an appraisal of cultural dynamics is a fundamental prerequisite to understand the
process of family mediation").
27. Francis Wardle, Are You Sensitive to Interracial Children's Special Identity Needs?,
42 YOUNG CILDREN 53, 56 (1987) (presenting guidelines for teachers of young
interracial children. This article emphasizes that teachers must provide a support-
ive environment during early childhood, when the "interracial child is exposed to
the social pressure of being different").
28. SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THuE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THlE REMAKING OF
WORLD ORuEiR 20-47 (1996) (affirming the importance of culture as the primary
variable for both development, and the conflict (based on racism and/or ethnocen-
trism) generated by that development. Huntington asserts that the world is di-
vided into eight major "cultural zones" based on cultural differences that have
persisted for centuries. These zones were shaped by religious traditions that are
still powerful today, despite the forces of modernization. The zones are Western
Christianity, the Orthodox world, the Islamic world, and the Confucian, Japanese,
Hindu, African, and Latin American zones).
29. NANCY J. ADLIER, INTERNATIONAI DIMENSIONS O- ORGANIZATIONAl BEHAVIOR
210 (South-Western Educational, 4th ed. 2002) (discussing the challenges of nego-
tiating globally and cross-culturally).
30. Id.
31. See James M. O'Neil, Summarizing 25 Years of Research on Men's Gender Role
Conflict Using the Gender Role Conflict Scale: New Research Paradigms and
Clinical Implications, 36 COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST 358, 358-59 (2008) (theo-
rizing and evidencing by empirical data "how men's gender role socialization con-
tributes to their psychological and emotional problems. The goal of this [article is]
to contribute to understanding male roles and the ways human services profession-
als can promote the growth of men." This research presents "a conceptual model
of how men's psychological problems are related to masculine gender role con-
2014]
262 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 20
use this metaphor because the American business culture and legal pro-
fession tend to be masculine and dominated by men and women with
masculine attitudes. 32 Therefore, this article aims to invite American
businesspeople and lawyers to put their egos aside and to try deal media-
tion and cross-cultural deal mediation. The main goal of this article is to
explain why and how cross-cultural deal mediation can be used as a new
and effective Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) method for interna-
tional business transactions.
II. WHAT IS DEAL MEDIATION AND CROSS-CULTURAL
DEAL MEDIATION
A preliminary definition of deal mediation is: a mediator that inter-
venes in the pre-contractual or bargaining phase of a contract to facilitate
the creation of a durable and efficient contractual relationship for the
benefit of the parties.33 The role of a cross-cultural deal mediator is prin-
cipally to serve as a neutral cross-cultural facilitator for the parties to help
flicts." This research "hypothesized that men are oppressed by rigid gender role
socialization processes (i.e., sexism) that limit them from being fully functioning
human beings. The model established men's gender role conflict (GRC) as a re-
search and clinical area in Counseling Psychology"); see also Jean Duncombe &
Dennis Marsden, Love and Intimacy: The Gender Division of Emotion and 'Emo-
tion Work' A Neglected Aspect of Sociological Discussion of Heterosexual Relation-
ships, 27 SocioLoGy 221, 221 (1993) (discussing "the role of ideologies of love and
intimacy in heterosexual coupledom, and examines the applicability of theories of
the gender division of 'emotion work' to the field of intimate personal relation-
ships." This research states that "despite dissatisfaction with gender inequalities in
domestic tasks and finance -many women express unhappiness primarily with what
they perceive as men's unwillingness or incapacity to 'do' the emotional intimacy
which appears to them necessary to sustain close heterosexual couple relation-
ships"). These two studies in the field of socio-psychology are important for this
article because they support the empirical findings of Hofstede that in a masculine
culture like the American culture, "being caring and gentle is for women" and men
should be viewed as tough and not overly relationship-oriented or emotional.
Therefore, the masculine American culture poses a barrier to deal mediation and
cross-cultural deal mediation since both types of mediation can be negatively inter-
preted as emphasizing "overly caring and gentle" behavior. HOFS-ITDE, ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 159 (discussing masculine orientation.)).
32. See Susan P. Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting Conversa-
tions About Women, the Academy, and the Legal Profession, 4 DUKI . J. GENDIER L.
& Poi'V 119,121-22 (1997) (discussing the American ultra-masculine "'gladiator'
model of legal education and lawyering celebrat[ing] analytical rigor, toughness,
and quick thinking." Defining "successful performance as fighting to win: an argu-
ment, a conflict, or a case. Even in more informal settings such as negotiations or
in-house advising, lawyering often proceeds within the gladiator model." Discuss-
ing "[t]he lawyer reasons back from the ultimate fight-in the courtroom, at the
bargaining table, or in the administrative hearing-to develop strategies and legal
responses that would best position the client to win should a crisis occur"). See
also HoisTEIuE ErT AL., supra note 4, at 135-85 (theorizing and offering empirical
data about the keys differences between a masculine culture like the United States
and more feminine cultures like Canada, Finland, Denmark, Norway, and
Sweden).
33. Peppet, supra note 1, at 301 (proposing that a deal mediator is like a "contract
embellisher." A skilled mediator or deal "mediator might find trades or packages
that the parties had overlooked because of carelessness, time pressure, limited
skills or experience, or strategic posturing.").
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them compare and bridge their cultural and legal differences that are
often a source of dispute in the bargaining process or later in the per-
formance of the contract. Both deal mediators and cross-cultural deal
mediators work in a neutral way to facilitate the bargaining process be-
tween the parties to help them reach an efficient and durable contractual
relationship. 34 However, the role of a deal mediator is not to force the
development of contractual relationship.35 A deal mediator acts on the
basis of objective, neutral, and independent standards and should advise
the parties to not sign the contract, if necessary. 36 This is especially im-
portant if a party (or both parties) feels like the lack of cross-cultural
understanding between the parties cannot be mitigated and that their
cross-cultural miscommunications and lack of cross-cultural synergy
37
may be interpreted as a high 38 cultural risk for the development of an
efficient and durable contractual relationship.
Because these concepts originate from ADR, the ideal cross-cultural
deal mediator is an international commercial lawyer with ADR skills.
39
As a result, it is important to first define ADR in the context of interna-
tional commercial disputes. ADR is usually defined as, "any process that
allows the parties to resolve their dispute without going to court. ''40 The
usual three ADR methods are negotiation, mediation, and arbitration.
ADR is voluntary in the sense that the parties must choose to refer their
dispute to ADR. In practice, well drafted international business con-
tracts will normally contain a multi-step (or multi-tier) dispute resolution
clause that will force the parties to attempt to resolve disputes arising out
34. L. Michael Hager & Robert Pritchard, Lawyers As Deal Mediators: The Value Of
Neutrality In International Business Negotiations, 28 INT'i Bus. LAW. 404, 405
(2000) (defining deal mediation is essentially "assisted negotiation" and the person
assisting needs to be a true neutral, endowed with the facilitative skills of a
mediator).
35. Peppet, supra note 1, at 323-24 (asserting "that if a mediator becomes driven to
close deals, then she loses her impartiality and objectivity. Not all deals should
close. Moreover, to earn the parties' trust and confidence, the parties must believe
that the deal mediator is not trying to force them to reach agreement.").
36. Id.
37. ADLER, supra note 29, at 103-33 (identifying the problems caused by cultural di-
versity. Discussing the potential advantages and disadvantages from cultural di-
versity for organizations. Presenting strategies to manage cultural diversity by
leveraging and creating cultural synergy between cross-culturally diverse organiza-
tions and people).
38. Again research show that international joint ventures failed at the rate of 50 per-
cent and that cross-border M&As failed at the rate 83 percent, see Bing, Gitelson
& Laroche, supra note 12, at 41; Schweiger & Goulet, supra note 13, at 1478-85.
39. Hager & Pritchard, supra note 34, at 405 (profiling commercial lawyers with ADR
skills as ideally suited for the role of deal mediator. This article identified lawyers
as the best qualified professionals to use for deal mediation. This article states that
lawyers are best suited for their listening skills, dispassionate judgment, and pa-
tience to deal with difficult people and situations). However, this article failed to
identify the best suited candidate for cross-cultural deal mediation and which abili-
ties they should possess. This articles aims precisely to fill that gap in deal media-
tion literature.
40. MITCIIILL MCINNES, MANAGING THE LAW: THE LEGAL ASPECIS OF DOING Bus-
INESS 51 (Pearson Education Canada, 3d. ed. 2011).
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of the contract by recourse to the three main ADR methods identified in
the following sequence unless agreed otherwise by the parties:
A) Negotiation in Good Faith
The parties shall endeavor to resolve any Dispute amicably by ne-
gotiation between executives who have authority to settle the Dis-
pute [and who are at a higher level of management than the
persons with direct responsibility for administration or perform-
ance of this agreement]; 41
41. See International Bar Association (IBA) Guidelines for Drafting International Ar-
bitration Clauses, 2010, available at http://www.ibanet.org/ENews Archive/IBA_27
October_2010_ArbitrationClausesGuidelines.aspx [Hereinafter IBA) Guide-
lines for Drafting International Arbitration Clauses], pp. 30-32 (last visited May
21, 2014) (offering DRAHIING GUIDELI NtS FOR MuLrn-TiR Disrurn- REsoLUTION
CLAUSES). Negotiation should be the first step. The top executives should be de-
signed as the participant because from my practical experience top executives have
usually all the necessary legal authority to make a settlement, they tend to see the
"bigger picture" and do not have time to be involved in stupid arguments. Also,
culturally speaking, as mentioned in this article, the hierarchy (Power Distance
following Hofstede) is fundamental in most foreign cultures. Finally, the good
faith requirement should be inserted. American business people and lawyers may
disagree, but they must be aware that the legal aspects of international business
negotiations practices and theories are largely based on civil law principles since
more than 75 percent of the world's legal systems can be classified as civil law
systems and mixed systems with a civil law tradition, see Civil Law Systems and
Mixed Systems with a Civil Law Tradition, UNIVERSITY OF' Or-rAWA, http://www
.juriglobe.ca/englsys-juri/class-poli/droit-civil.php (last visited May 6, 2014).
Therefore, European civil law recognizes a general area of pre-contractual liability
and the duty of good faith negotiation not recognized under U.S. commercial con-
tract law; however, it is important to note this legal concept is recognized in U.S.
labor law for collective bargaining. See Anthony Forsyth, Chairman's Lunch Semi-
nar U.S. National Labor Relations Board: Good Faith Bargaining: Australian,
United States and Canadian Comparisons (Nov. 20, 2009), available at http:Hpa
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1509825; see LARRY A. DIMATITPO &
LUCIEN J. DHOOGE, INTERNATIONAL BUSINEss LAW: A TRANSACrIONAL Ar-
PROACii 233-37 (Thomson-West, 2nd ed. 2006) (discussing the concept of pre-con-
tractual liability and duty of good faith in negotiation in European civil law and
international business transactions. Failure to negotiate in good faith in interna-
tional business negotiations, such as never intending to enter into contract to ob-
tain confidential information, is grounds for a claim of damages. Thus, terminating
lengthy negotiations without giving a viable reason or justified reason may also
lead to pre-contractual liability. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commer-
cial Contracts at articles 2.1.15 (2) and 2.1.16 clearly stipulate this principle by
stating that "a party who negotiates or breaks off negotiations in bad faith is lia-
ble" when it discloses or improperly uses confidential information obtained in the
course of negotiations. Breach of confidentiality may entitle the injured party to
compensation based on the benefit the party in breach received by disclosing the
information. The UNIDROIT Principles are indicative of how most civil law legal
systems are likely to affix liability in the negotiation stage), see Anne M. Burr,
Ethics in Negotiating: Does Getting to Yes Require Candor?, 56 JuiL-Dsi'. RESOI.
J. 8, 9 (2001) (discussing that in U.S. business contract negotiations "existing law
generally provides that the duty of good faith applies only to the performance and
enforcement of agreements, not negotiations. The unscrupulous [American] nego-
tiator might take this as a license [(carte blanche)] to behave unethically during
[U.S. domestic] negotiations for as long as such behavior is not out-and-out fraud-
ulent. The author argues, however, that there is such a thing as a reputation effect,
and that a bad reputation is ultimately deleterious. In this article, the author dis-
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B) Non-Binding Mediation in Good Faith;42
Any Dispute not resolved by negotiation in accordance with para-
graph (A) within [30] days after either party requested in writing
negotiation under paragraph (A), or within such other period as the
parties may agree in writing, shall be settled amicably by mediation
under the [designated set of mediation rules].
[All communications during the negotiation and mediation pursu-
ant to paragraphs (A) and (B) are confidential and shall be treated
as made in the course of compromise and settlement negotiations
for purposes of applicable rules of evidence and any additional con-
fidentiality and professional secrecy protections provided by appli-
cable law.]
C) Arbitration
All disputes arising out of or in connection with the present con-
tract shall be exclusively and finally settled under the Rules of Ar-
bitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by one or
more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said Rules
43
cusses the benefits of [good faith], and also the difficulties and costs of requiring
such [good faith] in business negotiations").
42. See IBA Guidelines for Drafting International Arbitration Clauses, pp. 30-32.
Supra n. 41 (offering drafting Guidelines for Multi-Tier Dispute Resolution
Clauses). See also Good Faith Participation in Mediation: Recent Decisions in
New York and California, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, available at
http://www.jdsupra.com/postldocumentViewer.aspx?fid=6941b9d9-265b-42e8-9e
42-e7e67a63771d (last visited May 6, 2014) (discussing "[i]n an effort to alleviate
the growing congestion of court dockets around the country, [American] judges
increasingly require parties to engage in alternative dispute resolution, particularly
mediation, prior to trial. Mediation is designed to be a confidential process lacking
the formality and adversarial nature of court proceedings. However, participation
in any court-ordered mediation is ultimately monitored by a judge. As a general
rule, courts require parties to participate in mediation in good faith, and judges
have the authority to sanction parties that fail to do so. The judge's authority to
impose sanctions for mediation conduct is grounded in the court's inherent author-
ity to regulate proceedings before it, and is further supported by local rules, Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f) (requiring good faith participation) and statutes
such as 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (prohibiting unreasonable or vexatious litigation). As in
other areas of the law, however, 'good faith' is not well defined. This article exam-
ines some recent decisions by federal courts in New York and California enforcing
the requirement of 'good faith' participation in mediation. While it is well settled
that a court may compel a party to mediate, it cannot compel a party to settle.
Moreover, courts take care to protect the confidential nature of mediation pro-
ceedings. Accordingly, the requirement of 'good faith' in mediation has clear lim-
its" [if the parties don't want to act in good faith]. However, a cross-cultural deal
mediator will be able to define the term "good faith" in the Cross-cultural Deal
Mediation Agreement between the parties, as a concept including, without limita-
tion: attending, and participating, in meetings at reasonable times; respecting the
participants (separating the people from the issues); timely disclosure of informa-
tion when require and when disclosure is legally authorized; responding to propos-
als in a timely manner; considering genuinely the proposals of the other side in a
interested-based manner for the mutual benefits of the deal.
43. Standard ICC Arbitration Clauses, INTE|RNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMM||RCE
(ICC), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=1 93
27358445 (last visited May 6, 2014). Apart from this standard clause from ICC, in
practice lawyers drafting and negotiating the commercial international arbitration
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(i.e., arbitration is final and binding and can be enforced via the
New York Convention). 44
The parties usually insert such clauses to preserve a fair and durable
business relationship. ADR also demonstrates the willingness of the par-
ties to respect the cultural preference of collective cultures like Japa-
nese 45 and Chinese 46 businesspeople to resolve commercial disputes
through cooperation and collaboration to maintain harmony. All exper-
ienced international businesspeople and lawyers know that "litigation is
the less preferred method of dispute resolution in many countries. ' 47 It is
important to stress the practical importance of cross-cultural deal media-
tion because, as mentioned before, "the best divorce is the one you get
before you get married." In addition, a cross-cultural deal mediator will
be able to mediate disputes after the contract is signed. The use of nego-
tiation and mediation in dispute resolution for international business
transactions should always be preferred in practice because even though
a foreign country may be a party to the UN Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards of 1958 (New York
Convention), other issues such as local government enforcement and cor-
ruption issues often make these types of treaties moot in those
instances.48
clause should always considered if the following issues should be covered: seat of
arbitration (i.e. legal jurisdiction to which the arbitration is tied), location of the
arbitration hearings, governing law (choice-law-clause to mitigate conflict of law
issues), arbitral rules, confidentiality, language(s) or arbitration, interim measures,
etc. See Practical Law (A Thomson Reuters Legal Solution providing legal know-
how ), International Arbitration Resources, available at http://us.practicallaw.com/
practice/us-international-arbitration#tab2_tabsdefault (last visited May 12th,
2014).
44. As last resort to adjudicate an international commercial dispute the international
business community turns to arbitration: "[a]rbitration awards are far easier to
enforce across national boundaries than are the judgments of national courts. This
is because more than 140 countries that have ratified the New York Convention on
Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards (the New York
Convention), are treaty bound to enforce foreign arbitral awards. There is no
comparable international treaty for the enforcement of foreign court judgments."
See e.g., Henry Chen, The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards in China,
Bloomberg Law Reports-Asia Pacific, BLOOMBE RG LAW RrPORTS (2009), availa-
ble at http://mwe.com/info/pubs/BLR-1109.pdf. The well-known advantages of ar-
bitration are summarized as faster and less expensive than litigation, parties can
select the arbitrator(s), the process is confidential, and the arbitral decision is bind-
ing and enforceable via the New York convention. Id.
45. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCHION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 302(3d ed. 1998) (discussing that arbitration is very popular in Japan, but it would be
wrong to overemphasize the Japanese preference for resolving disputes via negoti-
ation and mediation based on Confucianism. Many people familiar with Japan
believe it to be a myth that the Japanese are reluctant to litigate. The court system
in Japan has long been under strain (few litigators, judges and lengthy process);
that is why arbitration is growing in importance).
46. Id. at 292-93 (discussing the historic cultural preference for conciliation and medi-
ation in China).
47. See DIMA-ITEO & DHOOGE, supra note 41, at 123 (discussing ADR for interna-
tional commercial disputes).
48. John H. Matheson, Convergence, Culture and Contract Law in China, 15 MINN. J.
INT'L L. 329, 379 (2006) (discussing even though China is a party to the UN Con-
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Deal mediation and cross-cultural deal mediation focus on the first
method (negotiation) and the second method (mediation) to facilitate ne-
gotiation and dispute resolution. Negotiation in good faith means that
the parties will engage in a cooperative and interests-based discussion to
settle their commercial dispute. 49 Mediation is a process in which a neu-
tral and usually qualified attorney,50 called a mediator, helps the parties
to negotiate a mutually satisfactory settlement to avoid having to adjudi-
cate their dispute in court or through arbitration.51 Mediation can also be
defined as a negotiation session for conflict resolution with the assistance
of an expert (mediator). Mediation is neither conclusive nor binding.
Therefore, the mediator only proposes a settlement decision subject to
the good will and good faith of the parties.
Legal scholarship defines deal mediation or facilitation as "the applica-
tion of... [ADR] principles to the negotiation of any transaction or other
agreement," including, for example, "joint ventures, licensing contracts,
employment agreements, mergers and acquisitions. ' 52 Therefore, the
main purpose of deal mediation is defined as using a neutral third party
to assist with the bargaining of a transaction or contract and drafting of
the contract prior to the consummation of the deal and signature of the
contract. 53 Deal mediation is also referred in legal scholarship and prac-
tice as transactional mediation or conciliation; a deal mediator can also
be named a transactional mediator, facilitator, or conciliator. 54
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards of
1958 (New York Convention), "other issues such as the local government enforce-
ment issues make these types of treaties moot in those instances"). This practical
observation from this article can also be extended many other countries like China
presenting problems with corruption and the Rule of Law.
49. Burr, supra note 41, at 10 (discussing good faith in ADR).
50. David I .Bristow & Reva Seth, Good Faith In Negotiations, 55 Disp. Risoti uTrION
J. 16, 16 (2001) (discussing neutrality of the attorney in mediation and also defin-
ing the scope of a party's duty to negotiate or bargain in good faith by a duty
consisting of two obligations. "The first is to act 'in good faith' and the second is
the obligation to bargain. The former is negative in content as it prohibits certain
forms of bargaining behavior. The latter is positive in nature because it requires
the parties to negotiate with a view to the actual conclusion of an agreement").
51. See Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR:
Reconciling the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy, and
Confidentiality, 76 INo. L.J. 591, 592-604 (2001) (defining mediation, as a form of
alternative dispute resolution, "is premised upon the intention that by providing
disputing parties with a process that is confidential, voluntary, adaptable to the
needs and interests of the parties, and within party control, a more satisfying, dura-
ble, and efficient resolution of disputes may be achieved." Mediation is unique, as
it is nonbinding, and the mediator is present to facilitate "communication and ne-
gotiations between the parties," and not to impose a settlement on them. As a
result of the voluntary nature of mediation, "the potential to exploit bargaining
power or abuse the process is ripe.").
52. Joan Stearns Johnsen, Alternative "Deal" Resolution: The Facilitated Negotiation
Of Transactions, 30 WINDSOR RiFv. LEGAL & SOC. Issui7s 193, 194 (2011) (defin-
ing deal mediation or facilitation).
53. Id. at 194 (providing examples of the type of contracts appropriate for deal media-
tion or facilitation).
54. Peppet, supra note 1, at 283-84 (using the terms transactional mediator and trans-
actional mediator all through his article).
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There is currently no definition in American legal scholarship of cross-
cultural deal mediation.55 Like deal mediation, this concept appears to
be relatively new in legal scholarship. But there are a few articles on
cross-cultural mediation and the cultural aspects of mediation. 56 Legal
scholar John Barkai57 defines cross-cultural mediation as the competency
of a mediator to "understand and adapt to the cross-cultural differences
of the parties and use different approaches from those in domestic U.S.
mediations. '58 In compliance with the definitions of deal mediation and
cross-cultural mediation presented by legal scholars in the ADR field, I
offer this definition of cross-cultural deal mediation:
The application of ADR principles and principled negotiation to in-
ternational business transactions, particularly complex international
joint ventures, and cross-border mergers and acquisitions where the
development of an efficient and durable cross-cultural contractual
relationship between the parties is vital for the success of the transac-
tion. A cross-cultural deal mediator's role is to compare, under-
stand, and adapt to the legal and cross-cultural differences of the
parties and use different approaches from those in domestic U.S. me-
diations to leverage the cultural diversity of the parties as a competi-
tive advantage. Without the help of a cross-cultural deal mediator,
cultural differences often become a deal breaker. However, a cross-
55. Scott R. Peppet states that there is currently a "lack of discussion [and]/or promo-
tion of" deal mediation (or transactional mediation or facilitation) intervention in
U.S. domestic deals in the legal scholarship and ADR community. "Few
mediators seem to discuss or even be aware of [deal mediation]." See Peppet,
supra note 1, at 340. There is only one article arguing for transactional mediation
in the international context, see Hager & Pritchard, supra note 1, at 2-3, which
proposes a role for lawyer-mediators in international transactions, particularly if
cultural differences exist. On the widely used Internet search engine for legal aca-
demics called "Legal Trac" there are no scholarly publications on topic related to
"cross-cultural deal mediation" or "cross-cultural transactional mediation or facili-
tation" when last visited January 27, 2012. No related publications can be found
on the Internet search engine WestLaw (last visited January 27, 2012). There is
also nothing specific on this topic on the Google Scholar Internet search engine
(last visited January 27, 2012). Therefore, the concept of "cross-cultural deal medi-
ation" or "cross-cultural transactional mediation or facilitation" appears to be a
new concept. I also asked Edwin J. Greenlee, Associate Director for Public Ser-
vices and Professor of U.S. Legal Research at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School to confirm that this concept is new and that no scholarly articles have been
published on the topic. Mr. Greenlee's legal research confirms that "cross-cultural
deal mediation" or "cross-cultural transactional mediation or facilitation" is intro-
duced by this article. I would like to thank Mr. Greenlee for his legal research and
contribution to this article.
56. See Phyllis E. Bernard, Bringing Soul To International Negotiation, 25 NEGOTA-
"nON J. 147 (2009); Keren Lavelle, Ancient Ceremony Transformed Into Cross-Cul-
tural Mediation Training, 43 L. Soc'y J. 22 (2005); Lonnie Lusardo & Donna M.
Stringer, Bridging Cultural Gaps In Mediation, 56 Disi,. Ri7s. J. 29 (2001); Herbert
Fishgold, Douglas Henne, Marvin J. Levine & W.J. Usery, Jr., A Case Study In
Cross-Cultural Mediation: The General Motors-Toyota Venture, 41 ARBITIRATION
J. 5, 5-15 (1986); Barkai, supra, note 2, at 43.
57. Barkai, supra, note 2 (John Barkai is Professor of Law at the University of Ha-
waii's William S. Richardson School of Law and has researched on commercial
cross-cultural negotiation and dispute resolution.).
58. Id. at 44.
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cultural deal mediator can work to leverage these differences as syn-
ergic forces for the parties. In sum, the role of a cross-cultural deal
mediator is to compare, understand, and reconcile the cultural differ-
ences of the parties to allow the parties to develop an efficient and
durable contract if they choose to do so.
The above definition of cross-cultural deal mediation may still be too
theoretical and broad for practicing attorneys. Therefore, I feel it is im-
portant to go back to the definitions of negotiation and mediation in the
context of ADR. First and foremost, to understand deal mediation and
cross-cultural deal mediation, it is important to understand that negotia-
tion and mediation are too often simplified by the dual-concern theory,
meaning the duality between a collaborative win-win approach versus a
competitive win-lose approach59 As noted by G. Richard Shell in BAR-
GAINING FOR ADVANTAGE, defining negotiation as a dual-orientation be-
tween "win-win" (i.e., collaborating by enlarging the "pie" and crafting-
value to a deal that will allow both parties to completely satisfy their con-
cerns and interests) versus "win-lose" (i.e., when the negotiator focuses
only on his individual profit and satisfaction) is a non-practical simplifica-
tion of negotiation. 60 Experienced negotiators know that there are too
many situational and personal variables for a single strategy to work in all
cases. 61 Also, a recent data-driven study in cross-cultural management
demonstrated that the dual-concern model of conflict management the-
ory is not a good candidate for predicting negotiation behaviors during
cross-cultural business negotiations in a culture like China.62
If the dual-concern theory is overly simplistic, how should negotiators
and mediators approach the process of negotiating or mediating? They
should perceive the process as interplay of the three fundamental ap-
proaches to negotiating and resolving commercial disputes:
1) Rights-based (i.e., legally-binding litigation and arbitration and non-
binding rights-based mediation, such as mini-trial, 63 or when the
mediator acts like a judge or arbitrator, but with no binding author-
59. RICHARDI Siii, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE.: N-GooTIA11ON STRATEGIES FOR
REASONABLE PEOPLE xvi-xvii (2006).
60. Id. at xvii.
61. Id. xvi.
62. Zhenzhong Ma, Chinese Conflict Management Styles and Negotiations Behaviours:
An Empirical Approach, 7 Ir, r'L J. OF CROSS CULTURAL MGMT. 101, 114 (2007).
63. The ADR method of mini-trial has certain features that permit the accommoda-
tion in international business transactions, especially with regard to cross-cultural
disputes such as Chinese or Japanese preference for non-judicial dispute resolution
and the American preference for arbitration or for face-to-face negotiations within
the context of judicial dispute resolution. See Leo Kanowitz, Using the Mini-Trial
in U.S.- Japan Business Disputes, 39 MIRCER L. RiEv. 641, 646 (1988) (Defining
the mini-trial is a voluntary, confidential, and nonbinding ADR method just like
mediation and conciliation. "The parties agree to the procedural groundwork in
advance of the mini-trial. Both the American Arbitration Association and the
Center for Public Resources have developed mini-trial procedures. The mini-trial
is not a trial in the sense of an adjudicatory proceeding. It is rather a method of
structuring the settlement process in complex disputes. While the mini-trial can be
custom-tailored to a dispute, it often includes a foreshortened period of pre-trial
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ity. In the case of legally-binding litigation and arbitration, there
are winners and losers; therefore; this rights-based method can also
be associated with the power-based method);
2) Interest-based (i.e., non-binding negotiation, reconciliation, media-
tion, or conciliation, where interests are considered and considera-
tions are offered to reach an agreement or settlement between the
parties); and
3) Power-based (i.e., the ability to coerce the other party with the law,
power, or force).
These three approaches are the common ways people attempt to re-
solve their disputes. 64 However, it is important to realize that there are
cross-cultural dimensions associated with these three approaches. Some
cultures, like the American business culture, are known to be more legal-
istic, litigation-oriented, and focused on the right-based approach. 65
Overall, the strategic advantage of mediation is to encourage the parties
to embrace a more interested-based approach to conflict resolution. Nev-
ertheless, the interplay of the three approaches in practice will always
remain. For instance, the theory and practice of mediation has evolved to
allow the mediator to play the role of a judge or arbitrator using a rights-
based approach and also the role of a facilitator using an interests-based
approach to the conflict management between the parties simultaneously:
Evaluative mediation leans the process towards so-called 'rights-
based approaches,' and is indeed referred to by some as 'rights-based
mediation'. . . . As such, this approach arguably moves towards a
form of non-binding, persuasion-based adjudication. By contrast,
facilitative mediation focuses more on an interest-based process and
a less interventionist role for the mediator. The facilitative mediator
focuses on enhancing and clarifying communications between the
parties to help them decide themselves what to do, presuming that
they are better placed to devise effective solutions than is the
preparation, after which the lawyers for each party present to corporate manage-
ment a brief 'best-case' scenario of the merits of the dispute.").
64. WILLIAM URY, JEANNF M. BREFr & S-n-PI-IEN GOLDBERG, GLI-uING DisPuTF2s
RESOLVED 3-19 (1988) (discussing the three approaches to resolving disputes: In-
terests, Rights, and Power).
65. RICHARD SCHAFFER, BEVERLEY EARLE & FILIBERTO AGUSTI, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINEss LAW AND ITs ENVIRONMENT 74 (6th ed. 2005). (affirming that in inter-
national business Americans are known as notorious litigators, quickly turning to
the courts to redress grievances. This combative stance usually results in a "win or
lose" mentality."). See also TROMPENAARS & HAMPDEN-TURNER, supra note 8,
29-50 (offering empirical evidence that Americans are Universalists and are more
oriented towards universal justice principles, the Rule of Law, and also the con-
tracts in their business relationships. On the other hand, Particularist cultures like
China, Mexico, Brazil, India, and Russia seek justice and fairness by treating all
cases on their special merits.). Therefore, this moral clash tends to create many
cross-cultural conflicts in negotiations and dispute resolutions since both parties
tend to see each other as corrupted.
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mediator.66
In summary, a mediator's mandate is to mediate the interplay of these
three approaches in the negotiation and conflict resolution process. The
mediator mitigates the power-based struggles between the parties, and
ensures a more interest-based focus by using the appropriate balance of
interested-based and rights-based interventions. This holistic approach
towards negotiation and conflict resolution helps the mediator, deal me-
diator, or cross-cultural mediator to resolve the dispute between the par-
ties. The ultimate objective of a mediator will always be to get the parties
to work together to avoid litigation or arbitration or acts of coercion
causing the potential alienation of a contracting party.
A. MEDIATION, DEAL MEDIATION, AND CROSS-CULTURAL DEAL
MEDIATION SHOULD BE PRACTICED IN TERMS OF AN
INTERESTS-BASED APPROACH
Like mediation, deal mediation should be primarily based on resolving
the dispute by adopting an interests-based approach. In practice, follow-
ing an interests-based approach in mediation or deal mediation for an
American mediator or deal mediator usually means assisting the parties
to follow the four basic Principled Negotiation principles from the book,
Getting to Yes. 67
These four principles have led to the development of the well-known
ADR concept of principled negotiation (the win-win approach). 68 There-
fore, effective mediators, deal mediators and cross-cultural mediators
should be experts in principled negotiation.69 They should be able to ed-
ucate and persuade the parties to embrace principled negotiation in the
mediation process. However, in the context of international business a
66. Caroline Rees, Mediation in Business-Related Human Rights Disputes: Objections,
Opportunities and Challenges 4-5 (John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No.
56, Feb. 2010) (discussing the practical utility of mediation as a legitimate and com-
pelling dispute resolution mechanism in business-related human rights disputes).
67. Barkai, supra, note 2, at 50 (discussing that many American mediators generally
follow many of the basic negotiation principles from the book, Getting to Yes, as
the leading American model of negotiation and mediation, with its interest-based
framework). The four principles are the following:
1. Separate the people from the problem;
2. Focus on interest, not positions;
3. Generate options and a variety of possibilities deciding what to do to
settle the dispute; and
4. Insist that the results be based on some objective standard.
68. See RoGEiR FIStiER & WILLIAM Uity, GEiTING TO YES (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed.
1991). "The central ideas of the book are: separate the people from the problem
focus on interests and not positions, invent options for mutual gain, insist on using
objective criteria, and understand your BATNA (Best Alternative To a Negotiated
Agreement)." Barkai, supra, note 2, at 50. Professors Roger Fisher, William Ury,
and Bruce Patton are all from the Harvard Negotiation Project (HNP) at Harvard
Law School. The mission of HNP is to improve the theory and practice of conflict
resolution and negotiation by working on real world conflict intervention, theory
building, education and training, and writing and disseminating new ideas.
69. See Barkai, supra, note 2.
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cross-cultural mediator should understand that principled negotiation
emerged from Harvard Law Schoo 70 and is therefore infused with Amer-
ican cultural values. "Many American mediators generally follow many
of the basic negotiation principles from the book Getting to Yes, without
thinking much about how this approach is infused with key American
values such as individuality, equality and self-determination, and an infat-
uation with creative solutions."'7'
Therefore, a cross-cultural mediator understands that principled nego-
tiation, like the English language, may be dominant in international nego-
tiations and dispute resolution,72 but it must be subject to cultural
adjustments in the context of cross-cultural mediations and deal media-
tions.7 3 John Barkai argues that the concept of principled negotiation is
consistent with effective cross-cultural negotiation and mediation as long
the mediator is able to identify interests that seem to have a basis in cul-
tural differences. John Barkai refers to this method of conceptualization
as the Cultural Dimension Interests (CDI).7 4 In summary, I argue that all
ADR methods such as negotiation, mediation, deal mediation, cross-cul-
70. FISHER & URY, supra note 68, at 2.
71. Barkai, supra, note 2, at 50.
72. See GiEORGE P. FLETCHER & STEVE SHEPPARD, AMERICAN LAW IN A GLOBAL
CONTExr: Ti mE BASICS 69 (6th ed. 2005) ("It would be desirable for Right-oriented
legal cultures to develop a deeper appreciation for the potential of pluralistic
thought in the law. But the imperial flavor of Anglo-American legal influence
should be a cause of concern. The fact that international negotiations are con-
ducted primarily in English gives Anglo-American lawyers a natural advantage in
the market place of ideas and terminology. It would be better if American jurists
developed more respect for the languages and legal cultures of the rest of the
world so that these exchanges became reciprocal and mutually enriching.").
73. Id. at 17, 69 (This book discussing international negotiations are usually conducted
primarily in English gives American negotiators and lawyers, "a natural advantage
in the marketplace of ideas and terminology;" therefore, this is a strategic advan-
tage for American or English speaking native negotiators because they can more
easily influence and manipulate the negotiating and drafting of international busi-
ness contracts. However, this strategic advantage can also easily become a disad-
vantage because collective wisdom shows us that majority and dominant groups in
our society often lacks adaptability.); see also Chunlin Leonhard, Beyond the Four
Corners of a Written Contract: A Global Challenge to U.S. Contract Law, 21 PACE
INT'L L. Riv. 1, 1-36 (discussing that U.S. contract law has developed on the basis
of certain essential cultural assumptions such as freedom of contract, autonomy
and liberal individualism and that the bargain theory often does not produce dura-
ble and efficient cross-cultural contracts).
74. John Barkai, Cultural Dimension Interests, the Dance of Negotiation, and Weather
Forecasting: A Perspective on Cross-cultural and Dispute Resolution, 8 PEPP. DisP.
RnSoi.. L. J. 403, 444 (2008) [hereinafter Barkai, A Perspective on Cross-cultural
and Dispute Resolution] (explaining that Hofstede himself acknowledges that Get-
ting To Yes reflects high individualism, medium power distance index, and low
uncertainty avoidance. Getting-To-Yes may reflect low masculinity in its search for
"mutual gain" and a high long-term orientation in its search for enduring agree-
ments. However, these last two factors may be contrary to American culture,
which seen as high on masculinity and with a short-term orientation. In interna-
tional negotiations, the negotiators may hold different values, objectives, and truly
play the game of negotiation by different rules. They are accustomed to doing
different negotiation dances and listening to different music. However, the Get-
ting-To-Yes concept of "interest" can encompasses all those different via Barkai's
Cultural Dimension Interests (CDIs) as a useful conceptualization.).
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tural mediation, and cross-cultural deal mediation (if the CDIs are taken
into consideration) should be put into practice based on the theory of
principled negotiation.
B. MEDIATION, DEAL MEDIATION, AND CROSS-CULTURAL DEAL
MEDIATION CAN ALSO BE DEFINED IN TERMS
OF A RIGHT-BASED APPROACH
The rights-based approach to resolving disputes usually occurs after the
contract has been drafted and signed via litigation or arbitration, but it
also occurs when the mediator is acting as a judge or arbitrator providing
"non-binding, persuasion-based adjudication" 75 decisions to the parties.
In practice, the mediator will often tell the parties, "Based on my twenty
years of experience, I think that if you go to court or arbitration, this is
what's going to happen; therefore, you may want to reconsider your posi-
tion." The rights-based approach in deal mediation means that the deal
mediator is acting like a judge or arbitrator by providing his/her non-
binding and persuasion-based legal opinions to the parties drafting the
terms and conditions to be inserted in the contract.
III. HOW DOES CROSS-CULTURAL DEAL MEDIATION
WORK AND WHAT IS THE CROSS-CULTURAL
DEAL MEDIATOR'S ROLE
Even though, I have defined the concept of cross-cultural deal media-
tion in the introductory sections of this article, it may still appear theoret-
ically abstract. Therefore, the points below outline the cross-cultural deal
mediator's role in this new ADR method for international business
transactions.
A. How CROSS-CULTURAL DEAL MEDIATION WORKS: THE PROCESS,
CONTENT, AND ORIENTATION OF A CROSS-CULTURAL
DEAL MEDIATION SESSION
First, what is the cross-cultural deal mediator's role? How does the
cross-cultural deal mediator build, organize, and arrange the constituent
elements of a cross-cultural deal mediation to achieve concrete results?
The role of a cross-cultural deal mediator in practice can be viewed as a
dance instructor teaching a one-two-three step dance. Step One: The
cross-cultural mediator will also explain the process and answer ques-
tions. The cross-cultural deal mediator should get all parties to present a
summary of their values, points of views, interests, concerns (i.e., each
party gives a synopsis of the facts and aspirations in relation to the con-
tract they would like to sign). Step Two: After the parties have told the
facts and their interests, the cross-cultural deal mediator should ask for
clarification or elaboration on particular issues. The cross-cultural media-
tor may meet with each party separately in caucus to discuss the issues in
75. Rees, supra note 66, at 5.
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greater detail in order to gain a better sense of how the parties will be
able to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. The role of the cross-
cultural deal mediator is to identify the interests by using questions and
probing. A skilled cross-cultural mediator shifts the focus from positional
bargaining to interest-based negotiation to list and evaluate options for
satisfying as many interests as possible. Ultimately, this process helps the
parties to formulate a proposed draft agreement incorporating all of their
mutual interests identified. Attorneys for the parties may be present, but
because many cultures, like the Chinese culture,76 view lawyers nega-
tively, the cross-cultural deal mediator should conduct at least one session
without lawyers. The process should be kept confidential via a cross-cul-
tural deal mediation agreement that contains a confidentiality agreement.
This confidentiality requirement will be respected and enforced in most
jurisdictions in the United States.77 Step Three: Finally, if successful, at
the end of the process, a detailed written agreement is developed and
signed by the parties, usually after one or two days (or more) of caucuses
and collective sessions with the parties, the contract can then be reduced
to writing and signed by the parties. For purposes of stability and con-
tinuity, the cross-cultural deal mediator can help with renegotiations at
the closing and when the contract is signed; he can become the official
mediator for any legal dispute between the parties.7 8
76. See Zw-oii ewr & KOLz, supra note 45, at 292-93. Legal scholars Zweigert and
K6tz argue that the reactionary movement against "Western spirit" and the laws of
the early ideological perspective of the People's Republic of China were marked
by an anti-legal movement (with even incidents of extreme violence against law-
yers, who were considered enemies of the revolution). Following Zweigert and
K6tz, the idea of the law as a positive and fundamental component of a health
society is relatively recent and a radical change in China.
77. See Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs On Unif. State Laws, Uniform Mediation Act-
2001, 3 PiEPP. Disp. RESOi. L.J. 449, 504 (2003) ("Mediation communications are
confidential to the extent agreed by the parties or provided by other law or rule of
this State.") ("The communications by the mediator to the court or other authority
are broadly defined. The provisions would not permit a mediator to communicate,
for example, on whether a particular party engaged in "good faith" negotiation, or
to state whether a party had been "the problem" in reaching a settlement. Section
7(b)(1), however, does permit disclosure of particular facts, including attendance
and whether a settlement was reached. For example, a mediator may report that
one party did not attend and another attended only for the first five minutes.
States with "good faith" mediation laws or court rules may want to consider the
interplay between such laws and this Section of the Act."). Therefore, it is impor-
tant for the parties to select a governing law for the cross-cultural deal mediation
agreement (confidentiality agreement) that will protect the confidentiality to not
affect the arbitration or litigation.
78. Peppet, supra note 1, at 316-21 (discussing the benefits of mediators to manage
disputes that arise during the renegotiation phase after the contract is signed (con-
trol post-contractual opportunism) and how the deal "mediators can help the par-
ties during the closing to incorporate legal terms ex ante that constrain ex post
opportunism.").
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B. WHAT KIND OF CONTRACTS SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO
CROSS-CULTURAL DEAL MEDIATION?
Second, what kind of contracts should be subject to cross-cultural deal
mediation? I argue for any international business contracts. Particularly,
cross-cultural deal mediation should be used for more complex and rela-
tionship-oriented contracts such as cross-border strategic alliances (inter-
national joint venture and cross-border M&As) because of the necessity
to leverage synergic forces between the parties79 and their high failure
rate.80 Cross-cultural deal mediation can also be used for all interna-
tional business contracts that may imply that the parties will have to build
a relationship and work together on a longer-term basis, such as interna-
tional distribution agreements, franchise agreements, licensing agree-
ments, R&D agreements, etc. More transactional contracts like
international sale agreements can also be subject to cross-cultural deal
mediation. For instance, a party may feel mediation is needed because it
feels uncomfortable during the bargaining process due to lack of negotia-
tion experience or lack of bargaining power. Also, the parties may find it
appropriate because they envision the development of a long-term busi-
ness relationship with potential future contracts. Cross-cultural deal me-
diation can also be useful for domestic commercial contracts in the
United States between parties from different cultural or racial back-
grounds. This means cross-cultural deal mediators can be used to medi-
ate the drafting and negotiating of domestic commercial contracts, such
as shareholder agreements or franchise agreements between parties from
different ethnic, racial, or national origin cultures. For instance, it is a
well-known fact that many popular American franchises, such as McDon-
ald's, 7-Eleven, and Denny's, 81 are owned by immigrant investors, such as
African-Americans, Asian-Americans, Hispanic Americans, South-Asian
Americans, etc. Therefore, a prospective franchisee that is of a different
cultural or national origin may not be accustomed to the American style
of negotiation and legal culture, and thus may not understand all the
79. Schweiger & Goulet, supra note 13, at 1477-78 (proposing the strategy of Deep-
Level Cultural Learning Interventions (DCL) to leverage the cultural synergies
between in a strategic alliance. "Although acquisitions are a salient part of inter-
national business landscape, research has consistently found that they neither lived
up to the financial expectations of those who have transacted them or nor pro-
duced shareholder value for acquirers.").
80. See Bing, Gitelson & Laroche, supra note 12, at 40-41; see also Schweiger & Gou-
let, supra note 13, at 1477.
81. MICIIAEi KLIRR, RICHARD JANDA, & CHIP Purrs, CORPOIZATE SOCIAL RESIONSI-
nnli.ri: A Li GAL ANAL Ysis 317 (Chip Pitts ed., 2009). American franchises
should avoid the costly lesson of Denny's before leveraging cultural diversity as a
competitive advantage. In 1994, Denny's agreed to pay USD $54 million to settle
two lawsuits involving some 300,000 racial minority customer claimants who
claimed that Denny's was systematically refusing to serve them or subjecting them
to differential treatment such as insisting that they pay before being served at the
table. While the claimants sought and received compensation, they also sought to
change the way the corporations behaved and to have their needs and interests
engaged. By 1998, Denny's was among Fortune's best rated corporations in the
United States for engagement with Asians, Blacks, and Hispanics.
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terms and conditions of the agreement. Similarly, the American
franchisor may not be sensitive or receptive to the cross-cultural and in-
terracial differences at play in the development of their contractual
relationship.82
C. WHO SHOULD BE A CROSS-CULTURAL MEDIATOR?
Third, who should be a cross-cultural deal mediator? The ideal candi-
date should be an experienced commercial lawyer with ADR skills or a
professor of law in the field of ADR.83 The candidate should possess
expertise in the fields of comparative management 84 (i.e., cross-cultural
management, particularly in the fields of international organizational be-
havior, cross-cultural communication, negotiation, and dispute resolu-
tion) and also comparative law85 (i.e., the ability to compare and
82. See Leonhard, supra note 73, at 2; see also Robin J. Ely et al., Rethinking Political
Correctness, 84 HARV. Bus. REV. 79, 80 (2006) [hereinafter Rethinking Political
Correctness] (Interactions in American organizations "among people of different
races, genders, religions, and other potentially charged social identity groups" is
now inevitable. In the American "culture regulated by political correctness, peo-
ple feel judged and fear being blamed." White people feared to be perceived as
racist, men feared to be perceived as sexist, racial minorities and women are afraid
to be perceived as "playing the race or gender card." "They worry about how
others view them as representatives of their social identity groups. They feel in-
hibited and afraid to address even the most banal issues directly. Resentments
build, relationships fray, and organizational performance suffers."). This article
proposes strategy to go beyond political correctness and leverage diversity in
American organizations as an asset and not a liability.
83. Hager & Pritchard, supra note 34, at 405 (profiling "commercial lawyers with
ADR skills as ideally suited for the role of deal mediator." This article identified
lawyers as best qualified professionals to use for deal mediation. This article states
that lawyers are best suited for their abilities to listening skills, dispassionate judg-
ment and patience to deal with difficult people and situations). However, this arti-
cle failed to identify the best suited candidate to mediate cross-cultural deal
mediations and which abilities they should possess.
84. Comparative management (or cross-cultural management) theories are studies in
virtually all undergrad and MBA programs in North America through the
mandatory course of Organizational Behavior. This course is usually mandatory
for all understand and MBA students all Canadian and American business schools.
Recognizing that although legal knowledge, analytical and communication skills
are critical to career success, several decades of research demonstrate that raises,
promotions, and satisfaction in the legal profession also depend on expertise in
management and organizational behavior, the University of Pennsylvania Law
School has launched a new course for the Spring 2012 Semester called "Organiza-
tional Behavior." This course focuses on the managerial methods for the effective
accomplishment of tasks, goals, and projects in legal profession; how to work effec-
tively with other people and how to supervise and lead other people. This course
represents a unique collaboration between Penn Law and Wharton School to de-
velop knowledge, skills, and self-awareness relevant to management and organiza-
tional behavior in the legal profession. Therefore, understanding the human side
of management is an essential complement to the legal and technical skills of all
lawyers and especially cross-cultural deal mediators. See ADLER, supra note 29.
85. By comparative law, I refer to the study of differences and similarities between the
law (legal systems) of different countries. Comparative law is has more importance
in today's society because of globalization and internationalization of business. For
instance, international business law or international customary law is based on le-
gal transplants of various ideas from civil law and common law. Professor Ewald
(leading scholar in the United States in the field of comparative law) emphasizes
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understand differences between legal systems and cultures). The candi-
date should additionally possess a special legal expertise or knowledge in
the field of the international business contracts. A cross-cultural deal me-
diator should also be emotionally and culturally intelligent because tech-
nical and legal skills are insufficient.86
Should the mediator in international business transactions be a man?
What religion or ethnicity should the mediator belong to? U.S. societal
and business values promote achievement over ascription;8 7 therefore,
such questions are viewed as outrageously discriminatory. Americans
strongly value anti-discrimination laws and they have contributed to the
materialization of the American dream. Most Americans believe that a
person should not be judged on the basis of age, gender, country of ori-
that "comparative law should be geared toward studying the sorts of things that
concern practicing attorneys". See William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (1):
What Was It Like to Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 1894 (1995)
86. Cross-cultural deal mediator must seek to be pragmatic and find human competen-
cies that transcend political, technological, legal, economic, organizational, profes-
sional and cultural differences. Emotional intelligence (El) in negotiation means
the ability of a negotiator to view and use emotions as useful sources of informa-
tion that help one to make sense of and navigate successfully through the negotia-
tion, dispute resolution and mediation process. This concept is important in cross-
cultural negotiations, because a recent study conducted at the multinational John-
son & Johnson demonstrated that El competencies can be identified throughout
the world, indicating that these abilities matter for businesspeople and can be as-
sessed anywhere a company operates. See DANIEL GOLEMAN ET AL., PRIMAL
LEADERSHIP: LEARNING TO LEAD WITH EMOTIONAl INTELI GENCE 37 (2002);
ADLER, supra note 29, at 164-207 (discussing global leadership, motivation and
decision making); TiHOMAS VULPE, DANIEl KEALEY, DAVID PROTUIEROE AND
DOUG MACDONALD, GOV'T OF CANADA, A PROFILE OF THE INTERCULTURALLY
EFFECTIVE PERSON 14-19 (2nd ed., 2001). The Centre for Intercultural Learning
(CIL), Canadian Foreign Service Institute, Department of Foreign Affairs and In-
ternational Trade, has developed the Profile of the Interculturally Effective Person
(IEP). This cross-cultural theory is used for instance by the Canadian Foreign Ser-
vice Institute to train Canadian diplomats and soldiers on cross-cultural sensitivity.
Following CIL's concept of cultural intelligence, there are nine core competencies
that a cross-cultural deal mediator must possess to be considered culturally
intelligent:
1. Adaptation Skills;
2. An attitude of modesty and respect;
3. Understanding the concept of culture;
4. Knowledge of the host country and culture;
5. Relationship-building;
6. Knowledge of self;
7. Intercultural communication;
8. Organizational skills; and
9. Personal and professional commitment.
See generally Center for Intercultural Learning, FOREIGN AFFAIRS & INT'L TRADE
CAN., http://www.international.gc.ca/cfsi-icse/cil-cai/pubpap-pubdoc-eng.asp (last
visited May 6, 2014).
87. TROMPENAARS & HAMPDEN-TURNER, supra note 8, at 105-122 (theorizing and
offering empirical comparison between Achievement-oriented societies like the
United States and Ascription-oriented societies like China, Latin American and
Middle East societies). In North American society we accord mostly status on
basis of achievement and merit, in ascription-oriented societies like Argentina or
China where they accord status on basis of age, gender, social status, education,
seniority, etc.
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gin, or racial background, but rather should be "judged by the content of
their character," as Martin Luther King, Jr. once said. In contrast, as
evidenced by the empirical study by Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner,
most non-western cultures (such as East Asian, South Asian, Latin
American, African, and Caribbean) operate on the basis of ascription.
Age, gender, country of origin, religion, social class, and racial back-
ground are all ascription factors that can determine a person's leadership
capabilities. 88 Western nations like the United States, Canada, France,
and England are committed to democratic systems in the form of mer-
itocracies; however, social injustice based on gender, sexual orientation,
race, country of origin, and religion still persist today. In the United
States, the concept of equality is set forth in the constitution and remains
a powerful aspirational dream, but inequalities still persist.89 Harvard
Business Review published an article titled Re-Thinking Political Correct-
ness about the importance and prevalence of interactions in American
organizations among people of different races, genders, religions, and
other potentially charged social identity groups are now inevitable. The
article stresses the point that these interactions should not be ignored or
engaged in on a basis of political correctness. 90 In the international busi-
ness world, ignorance of political correctness towards cultural and racial
diversity can undermine the development of a durable and efficient cross-
cultural contractual relationship. Because most cultures are ascription-
oriented, studies suggest that the ideal cross-cultural mediator for inter-
national transactions is an older (gray hair is associated with wisdom
("matiere grise")), heterosexual Caucasian man, 91 who has very high so-
88. Id. at 102.
89. See EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, ECONOMIC JUsTIcE: RACE,
GENDER, IDENTITY AND ECONOMICS: CASES AND MATERIALS, (2d ed. 2005) (in-
troducing law students to a systematic examination of the interdisciplinary dimen-
sions of increasing economic inequality and the role of identify in the distribution
of wealth in the United States. This casebook is promoting economic justice in the
United States).
90. See Ely et al., supra note 82.
91. See THOMAS BORSTELMANN, THE COLD WAR AND THE COLOR LINE: AMERICAN
RACE RELATIONS IN THF GLOBAL ARENA 222-266 (2001) (discussing race rela-
tions in global area and the white supremacy in race relations since the end of the
cold war. The author who is a professor of modern world history at the University
of Nebraska-Lincoln affirms the importance and predominance of white authority
in the global area). As a practitioner in international development, I have ob-
served many Canadians (including from the government of Canada) challenging
the status and legitimacy of my father's NGO incorporated under the federal laws
of Canada. For example, the Government of Canada has designated my father's
NGO as a NGO from the Haitian diaspora. Thus, this status may sound like a
positive recognition of the Haitian cultural origin and Black racial origin of my
father and his NGO, but my father has never been treated by the Canadian gov-
ernment or Canadian NGO community as a "real" Canadian. Also, black Africans
and Haitians have also challenged the authority and leadership of my father as the
president-founder of a Canadian scientific-based NGO. His strategy for dealing
with racism was simple and pragmatic: he always secured the support of respected
white professors and experts from Canada for his NGO. He also always made sure
to always bring a "white man" with him for his missions in Haiti. For instance, one
of his white associate agronomists, emeritus professor Claude A. St-Pierre from
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cial status.92 Although this is considered discriminatory profiling for
many, this profile is often considered ideal for most ascription-oriented
business cultures.93 There are two options to avoid falling into the trap of
discrimination and choosing a cross-cultural deal mediator on basis of
achievement. 9
4
1) To choose the most skilled and competent cross-cultural deal media-
tor solely on the basis of achievement or meritorious criteria:
Pros: this will correlate with American egalitarian values and the
achievement-oriented way of doing business. This could be per-
ceived as a political, legal, and ideological statement by the Ameri-
cans to other parties. Such statements are often useful or necessary
in diplomacy. American and European multinational corporations
often operate under the same anti-discriminatory policies in foreign
countries by following a corporate accountability policy or Corporate
Social Responsibility (CSR) policy. Also, American corporations
abroad may be subject to U.S. anti-discriminatory laws if Congress
has clearly intended such an extraterritorial reach. 95 Also, it is im-
portant to mention that recent empirical research conducted for the
World Bank shows that gender differences do not really affect the
performance of an international firm.9
6
Cons: the cross-cultural deal mediator selected on the basis of
achievement-oriented criteria may have difficulty fulfilling his man-
date successfully. Parties from ascription-based cultures may chal-
Universit6 Laval is one of the most renowned agronomists in Canada, holding a
PhD from Cornell University and many patents in the field of agricultural biotech-
nology. I also had a friend (Indo-Canadian) who went on an international assign-
ment for two years in India for a Canadian technology company tell me that all
Indians thought the manager was my father's white Canadian colleague, when he
was in fact the manager who had been selected based on his superior technical,
managerial, linguistic and cultural skills. Racism in international business negotia-
tions is a taboo topic in North American literature, but this is still a sad reality. I
feel this topic should never be avoided until we find solutions to this problem
based on equality.
92. Id.; see also HOFS'rlEDE i-r AL., supra note 4 at 53-88 (theorizing and offering em-
pirical data to measuring the degree of power distance (degree of ascription and
tolerance to inequality in a society). Following these empirical data, the United
States is an equalitarian society with a low power distance index and cultures like
China, Latin American, and Middle Eastern cultures are societies with very high
power distance index).
93. Horis-nDE [iTr AL., supra note 4 at 53-88.
94. This question is also valid for the selection of members of an American negotiation
team that will be involved in cross-cultural negotiations.
95. See DETI-Lv F. VAGTS, WILI AM S. DODGE & HARNOLD HONGJU Koii, TRANSNA-
rIlONAL BUSINESS PRO13LEMS 98-117 (4th ed. 2008) (discussing the examples of
extraterritorial application of U.S. anti-discriminatory laws.) The application of
U.S. federal employment law operates under the general presumption that U.S.
laws will not be presumed to apply beyond U.S. territorial jurisdiction unless the
U.S. Congress clearly has intended such extraterritorial reach. See E.E.O.C. v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
96. See, e.g., Shwetlena Sabarwal & Katherine Terrell, Does Gender Matter for Firm
Performance? Evidence from Eastern Europe and Central Asia (World Bank Policy
Research, Working Paper 4705, 2008), available at https://openknowledge.world
bank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/6783/WPS4705.txt?sequence=2.
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lenge this leadership role.97
2) The second and more pragmatic option (but more costly) is to find
the right balance between the ascription and achievement-oriented
ways of mediating an international deal by having two cross-cultural
deal mediators.
One cross-cultural deal mediator should be selected on ascription-
based criteria to co-lead the people involved in the cross-cultural deal
mediation. The structure of the cross-cultural deal mediation should give
the mediator a high, authoritative status. 98 The structure should also give
him an image of power and prestige and he must appear to be the true
leader.99 It is important to remember that the cross-cultural deal media-
tor is acting as the co-leader to! assist the parties to reach a deal. There-
fore, the selection of the cross-cultural deal mediator must coordinate
with to the cross-cultural leadership orientation of the parties. 100 Ameri-
can culture values leadership based on achievement-orientation' 01 and in-
ference-based perception.' 0 2 However, cultures like China, Japan,
Mexico, and India are more ascription-oriented and value leadership
based on collectivism and high power-distance. 0 3 The second cross-cul-
tural deal mediator should be selected on the basis of achievement-ori-
ented criteria in order to lead the process content and formulate the
interested-based and right-based opinions for the parties to consider as a
way to reach an efficient and durable contract. His role will also be to act
as an advisor to the cross-cultural deal mediator on the basis of ascriptive
criteria to help him to co-lead all the parties efficiently and to assist him
in fulfilling his mandate. The pros and cons of this method of selection
for the cross-cultural deal mediator are as follows:
Pros: Co-leading is a more pragmatic solution that strikes the right
balance between achievement and ascription-oriented values when
selecting the cross-cultural deal mediators.
Cons: The cost of two cross-cultural deal mediators is much higher.
Also, having two mediators might affect the process and cause it to
be more time consuming. For instance, instead of one or two days,
97. Jun Yan & James G. Hunt, A Cross-Cultural Perspective on Perceived Leadership
Effectiveness, 5 INT'L J. OF CROSS CULTURAL McGM'r. 49, 51-52 (2005) (discussing
a theoretical model to explain how societal/cultural settings may influence the
leadership perception process of the followers and the way they perceived leader-
ship effectiveness to be achieved. This article offers empirical data evidencing that
Americans perceived leadership effectiveness on basis of inference-based percep-
tion (i.e. functional aspects of leadership and achievements of the leader) and
ascription-oriented societies like China, Latin American, and Middle Easter socie-
ties perceived leadership effectiveness on basis of recognition-based perception
(i.e. people emerge as group leaders by fitting the shared conceptions of follow-




101. TROMPENAARS & HAMPDEN-TURNER, supra note 8 at 104.
102. Yan & Hunt, supra note 97 at 51-52.
103. Id. at 53-56.
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the parties may need three days of cross-cultural deal mediation.
However, as a practicing transactional lawyer, I will argue that if you
think cross-cultural deal mediation is expensive or causes additional
unnecessary transactional costs, wait to see the cost of failing to
reach an agreement or signing a contract that leads to litigation or
arbitration! A few thousand dollars extra spent on the formation a
multi-million dollar contract should be viewed as a marginal invest-
ment. Finally, this option may also be perceived as a compromise by
Americans to accommodate the discriminatory practices of ascrip-
tion-oriented cultures.
D. WHERE SHOULD THE MEDIATION TAKE PLACE?
Fourth, where should the cross-cultural mediation take place? It
should be the cross-cultural mediator's responsibility to select a location
in consultation with the parties. Ideally, a wise cross-cultural mediator
will chose a neutral territory where the parties will arguably be more
likely to work cooperatively. The mediators should also take the parties'
budgets into consideration. Whichever location (usually a hotel confer-
ence room) is chosen, it should be large enough to accommodate all the
parties and it should be fully equipped with a telephone, internet, com-
puters, comfortable chairs, visual aids, videoconferencing, and food and
refreshments. For example, as an alternative to the boardroom table, the
cross-cultural deal mediator could arrange the tables so that the parties
sit on the same side of the table. In "facing the problem" this way, they
compete with the problem, not with the people.104 The ideal city will also
allow the parties to do social activities together after the cross-cultural
deal mediation in evenings to solidify developing relationships. 10 5
E. WHEN SHOULD THE CROSS-CULTURAL MEDIATION HAPPEN?
Fifth, when should the cross-cultural mediation take place (timing) and
how long should the cross-cultural deal mediation take place (duration)?
The timing should be at the early stage of negotiations. The cross-cul-
tural deal mediator should not intervene at the outset of negotiations and
should let the parties get to know each other. However, the cross-cul-
tural mediator should intervene in the early stage of the contract negotia-
tion, more precisely, before the parties start to draft and negotiate the
specific terms and conditions. The duration should be a minimum of one
day, with the possibility of two, three, four, or even more days depending
on the complexity of the contract to be negotiated and the behaviors of
104. Aii izi, supra note 29, at 218 (discussing the physical arrangements for negotiating
globally in an effective manner).
105. Id. at 225-26 (discussing that social activities are vital in many cultures for inter-
personal relationship and trust building); see also RoGEzR FisliI:R & DANIIE SIIA-
PitO, BEYOND REASON: USING EMOTIONS AS You NEGOTIATE 60 (2005)
(discussing that reducing personal distance is vital in cross-cultural negotiation and
mediation).
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the parties. As discussed, more time may be required if there are two
cross-cultural deal mediators.
F. WHO BEARS THE COST OF MEDIATION?
Sixth, who pays for the cross-cultural mediation session? The parties
should equally pay the costs of the cross-cultural deal mediation services
(i.e., cost for the cross-cultural deal mediators' services and travelling ex-
penses), and each party should pay their own costs of participating in the
cross-cultural deal mediation. A party with more bargaining power and
financial means could offer to pay the other party's share of the cost for
the cross-cultural deal mediator as a good faith gesture. As a transac-
tional lawyer, I have often observed government agencies or large corpo-
rations paying for the cost of mediating a commercial dispute. Their
decision to bear the cost of the mediation for the other party was not
based on altruism, but was seen as investment to show good faith and to
maintain a business relationship. There is also a strategic benefit in offer-
ing to pay the costs of mediation. If the dispute reaches a court or arbi-
tral tribunal, such behavior could be viewed by the judge/arbitrator as
evidence of good faith by the party with more bargaining power. Even
though the contents of cross-cultural deal mediations are confidential,
participation in mediations is typically not kept confidential. If it is usu-
ally evidence that a contract is unconscionable in American contract law,
in civil law jurisdictions like China, bad faith (i.e., lack of fair dealing,
inequality of bargaining power of the parties, and unfair standard agree-
ments imposed during the negotiation phase) is taken into consideration
by the Chinese courts in gap-filling.' 0 6 Therefore, cross-cultural deal me-
diation may be used strategically as a shield against such claims.
In sum, it is important for the cross-cultural mediator to consult with
the mediating parties in planning the mediation session. The mediator
should select a location agreeable to both parties; prepare the location to
be accommodating to both parties; determine the participants on the ba-
sis of their CDIs, 0 7 and structure the form and content of the cross-cul-
tural deal mediation in consultation with the parties.
106. John H. Matheson, Convergence, Culture and Contract Law in China, 15 MINN. J.
INT'i. L. 329, 351 (2006) (discussing the gap-filling approach in Chinese contract
law). If the unconscionability defense in American contract law is difficult to suc-
cessfully plead, Chinese courts operate under the concept of "gap-filling." This
means that the courts have great interpretative discretion and power to interpret
the fairness of the contract on a case-by-case basis. This looks like a nightmare for
many American attorneys.
107. Barkai, A Perspective on Cross-cultural and Dispute Resolution, supra note 74, at
1-2. As practitioner I have observed that it is important to ensure that the people
responsible to the implementation (e.g. technicians, engineers or mid-level manag-
ers) of the deal/project to be integrated in the negotiating and drafting of the con-
tract. Their feedback and contribution will ensure that the contract is realistic,
efficient and durable.
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G. THE CROSS-CULTURAL DEAL MEDIATOR'S ROLE: THE TASK OF
MEDIATING CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON THE NEGOTIATING AND
DRAFTING OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
I will offer a toolbox to help cross-cultural deal mediators compare,
understand, and adapt to cross-cultural differences. Comparative man-
agement theorists have developed theoretical tools based on extensive
empirical research' 0 8 for cross-cultural deal mediators to perform their
main task (i.e., dealing with cultural differences). There are unfortu-
nately no specific tools available for the cross-cultural deal mediator to
uncover the other layers.' 0 9
The toolbox I have developed will help the cross-cultural deal mediator
compare, understand, and adapt the cross-cultural differences of the par-
ties and use different approaches from those in domestic U.S. mediations
to leverage the cultural diversity of the parties as a competitive advan-
tage. This toolbox is composed of four indispensable tools.
The first tool is Hall's comparative model with the notion of cultural
context high and low cultural contexts.I10 Following Hall's low context
business communication means, the verbal or written (e.g., emails, letters,
contracts, etc.) communications must be made direct and explicit. In a
108. See TROMPENAARS & HAMPDEN-TuRNER, supra note 8, at 252-63 (discussing the
empirical data and database of 7-D model); see also HOFSTEDE ET AL., supra note
4, at 27-49 (discussing the empirical data and database of Hofstede's Five Cultural
Dimensions).
109. 1 will argue that the first layer is national culture because the first job of a cross-
cultural deal mediator is to, "cope with cultural clashes" and "prepare for possible
cultural barriers" in the deal mediation process. See INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIA-
"IIONS: CROss-CuLTURAL COMMUNICATIONS SKILLS FOR INTERNATIONAL Busi-
NESs ExECUTIVES, supra note 20. The second layer is organizational culture or
corporate culture (e.g. the organizational culture of the U.S. Department of Justice
as a governmental organization is very different from the organizational culture of
Google or LG). There are a lot of similarities between national cultures and orga-
nizational cultures because when people set up an organization they will typically
borrow from models or ideals that are familiar to them. The organizational culture
is therefore significantly influenced by the national culture. The third layer is the
legal culture or system (e.g. civil law or common law or Islamic law) or the profes-
sional culture of the negotiators (e.g. lawyers, accountants or engineers, etc.). For
instance, it is important to compare the American and Chinese professional legal
cultures. Since contracts are legal instruments, the way a legal profession is struc-
tured will inevitably influence the negotiation process between foreign negotiators.
The fourth and last layer is the negotiator's personality. The influence of the first
three layers (national culture, organizational culture and legal and professional
cultures) on the negotiation process is largely influenced by cultural differences
between Americans and foreign cultures. Sometimes culture matters a lot, some-
times not at all! This is why the study of behavioral psychology can also help the
cross-cultural deal mediator. As a result, a cross-cultural deal mediator must pos-
sess high emotional and social intelligence).
110. See generally EDWARD T. HAL L, TiHEI SI..ENT LANGUAGE (1959); EDWARD T.
HAI..L, THE HIDDEN DIMENSION (1966); EDWARD T. HALL, BFYOND CUILTURE
(1976); EDWARD T. HALL, THE DANCE O1F LIFE: THE OTHER DIMENSION O1F TIME
(1983); EDWARD T. HALL, HIDIEN Dn .ERENCES: STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAI
COMMUNICATION (1985); EDWAIU:t T. HALL, HIDDEN DIFFERENCES: DOING Busi-
NESS WITH THE JAPANESE (1987); EDWARD T. HALL, UNDERSTANDING CUIAI'URAL
DIFFERENCES, GERMANS, FRENCH AND AMERICANS (1990).
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low context culture like the United States, someone is considered a good
communicator for his/her ability to get to the point, and be concise and
precise in his communications. Low context communications are marked
by informal communication (no need to say Dr., Sir, Mr.; "just call me
Jack" attitude), "let's get it straight," "what's your point," or "let's get
down to business" attitudes that can be interpreted as rude for high con-
text communicators such as the Japanese, Chinese, Arab, or Latin Ameri-
can businesspeople (especially at the early stage of a business
relationship). High context communication means: the verbal and writ-
ten communications are more indirect, evasive, tactful, and even ambigu-
ous. High context communicators are known to be diplomatic and put
great importance on using flourishing language. In written communica-
tions, words are considered carefully and subject to deep reflection. For
instance, my father, who is from a high context Haitian culture, can take
up to two days to draft a letter as the president-founder of his scientific-
based NGO in agriculture. I have also observed that during negotiations
my father uses metaphors and stories when addressing letters to the Pres-
ident of the Republic of Haiti, ministers, or peasants, which are rarely
straight on the point at issue. I asked him once why he uses such meth-
ods, and he said "My son, you talk too much. You're always like an open
book. People don't need to know what you think exactly. You need to
give them space to think." This led me to believe that high context com-
municators like my father are more skilled at diplomacy and power
games in some ways due to cultural tendencies. The fourth law of the
bestseller 48 Laws of Power, by Robert Greene, is "Always Say Less than
Necessary.11' As a result, a great cross-cultural communicator and nego-
tiator knows how to balance and manage low and high context
communications.
The second tool is the comparative model of Hofstede's six Cultural
Dimensions, as he recently added a sixth dimension. This cross-cultural
management tool is based on extensive empirical research and is proba-
bly the most utilized tool in international business." 2 Hofstede offers a
map of the world for each cultural dimension, which enables one to
quickly see how similar or different countries or regions are on the basis
of five cultural dimensions:
1. Power Distance (importance of hierarchy and ascription in a
society);
2. Individualism (if the society is individualist or collectivist);
111. ROBERT GP.rLNE, TilE 48 LAWS OF POwER (2000) ("the more you say the more
you appear just like everyone else. Deal in opaqueness, never let anyone really
know the truth of what you are saying. The more you talk, the more information
you give away and thus, the more your power decreases. This is because by talk-
ing, we reveal our intentions, biases, quirks and personality (basically, we reveal
who we are). When this information reaches the ears of other people, it can be
used to stop your plans, it can be used against you or it can be used to gain your
favor.").
112. HOFSTEDE ET AL., supra note 4.
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3. Masculinity ("A preference in society for achievement, heroism, as-
sertiveness and material rewards for success. Society at large is
more competitive. Its opposite, femininity, stands for a preference
for cooperation, modesty, caring for the weak and quality of life.
Society at large is more consensus-oriented"); 113
4. Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI) ("The degree to which the members
of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity. The
fundamental issue here is how a society deals with the fact that the
future can never be known: should we try to control the future or
just let it happen? Countries exhibiting strong UAI maintain rigid
codes of belief and behaviour and are intolerant of unorthodox be-
havior and ideas. Weak UAI societies maintain a more relaxed atti-
tude in which practice counts more than principles");" 14
5. Long-Term Orientation (It can be interpreted as dealing with soci-
ety's search for virtue. Societies with a short-term orientation are
generally highly concerned with establishing the absolute truth.
They are normative in their thinking. They exhibit great respect for
traditions, a relatively small propensity to save for the future, and a
focus on achieving quick results. In societies with a long-term orien-
tation, people believe that truth depends very much on situation,
context, and time. They show an ability to adapt traditions to
changed conditions, a strong propensity to save and invest, thrifti-
ness, and perseverance in achieving results); 115
Hofstede recently added a sixth cultural dimension:
6. Indulgence versus Restraint (INR);
INR is a new dimension that was recently added to the traditional
five dimensions model. "Indulgence stands for a society that allows
relatively free gratification of basic and natural human drives re-
lated to enjoying life and having fun. Restraint stands for a society
that suppresses gratification of needs and regulates it by means of
strict social norms." 1 1 6
The third tool is the comparative model of Trompenaars Hampden-
Turner's seven cultural dimensions. This cross-cultural management tool
complements Hofstede's six cultural dimensions and is also based on ex-
tensive empirical research. 117 The seven Cultural Dimensions are:
1. Universalism vs. particularism (What is more important, rules or
relationships?)
2. Individualism vs. collectivism (communitarianism) (Do we function
in a group or as individuals?)
113. Dimensions, THE HOFSTEDE CENTRE, http://geert-hofstede.com/dimensions.html




117. HOFSTEDE ET AL., supra note 4 at 5.
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3. Neutral vs. emotional (Do we display our emotions?)
4. Specific vs. diffuse (How separate do we keep our private and work-
ing lives)
5. Achievement vs. ascription (Do we have to prove ourselves to re-
ceive status or is status given to us?)
6. Sequential vs. synchronic (Do we do one thing at a time or several
things at once?)
7. Internal vs. external control (Do we control our environment or are
we controlled by it?)
The fourth tool is the comparative model of Barkai's Cultural Dimen-
sion Interests. Barkai argues that effective cross-cultural negotiations
and dispute resolution requires an understanding of Cultural Dimension
Interests (CDIs). 118 As a legal scholar, his theory reviews many of the
cultural interests that impact negotiation and dispute resolution by: 1)
specifically reviewing the cultural theories of Edward T. Hall, Geert Hof-
stede, Fons Trompenaars and Charles M. Hampden-Turner, and Richard
D. Lewis; 2) considering country-specific anecdotal accounts of national
negotiating behaviors; and 3) reviewing some specific beliefs, behaviors,
and practices that impact national negotiation styles and approaches. The
thirty-six Chinese strategies are reviewed and applied to negotiations.
CDI focuses mainly on cross-cultural differences between American and
Asian negotiation styles and behaviors.11 9
Finally, it is important that there are other very useful comparative
models available to the cross-cultural deal mediator, but in my opinion,
the theories mentioned are the main ones that should always be in each
cross-cultural deal mediator's toolbox. 120
118. Barkai, A Perspective on Cross-cultural and Dispute Resolution, supra note 74, at
444.
119. See generally id.
120. See Laurent's cross-cultural theory of EXPERT V. PROBLEM SOILVER MANAGER.
See Andr6 Laurent, The Cultural Diversity In Western Conceptions Of Manage-
ment, 13 INT'L STUDIES OF MGMT. & ORG. 75, 86 (empirical study that leads to the
development of the cross-cultural comparison model of the role of the manager/
negotiator as an Expert v. Facilitator/Problem Solver. For instance, 77 percent of
Spaniards and 78 percent Japanese will think that "it is important for managers/
negotiators to have at hand precise answers to most questions their subordinates
may raise about their work" and there be an expert, however 10 percent of Swed-
ish and 18 percent of Americans disagree with this statement and think that a
manager or negotiator should be a facilitator or problem solver). For a discussion
of universal values as latent motivations and needs, see Schwartz's cross-cultural
theory of Basic Human Values. See Shalom H. Schwartz, Universals In The Con-
tent And Structure Of Values: Theory And Empirical Tests In 20 Countries 25 AD-
VANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 5-12 (1992), available at http://cite
seerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.220.3674&rep=repl &type=pdf
(this theory based on empirical study identifies ten motivationally distinct value
orientations that people in all cultures recognize, and it specifies the dynamics of
conflict and congruence among these values:
1. Self-Direction: Independent thought and action; choosing, creating,
exploring;
2. Stimulation: Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life;
3. Hedonism: Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself;
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IV. WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS OF CROSS-CULTURAL
DEAL MEDIATION?
It has taken more than three decades for American attorneys to accept
the benefits of ADR and realize that there is more than one way (other
than litigation) to resolve disputes.12 ' In the United States, virtually all
international commercial disputes are solved by ADR methods (i.e., ne-
gotiation, mediation and arbitration). A survey of more than 530 corpo-
rations in the Fortune 1,000 category shows that 90 percent of the polled
corporations viewed ADR as a critical cost-control technique, and more
than half (54 percent) said cost pressures directly affected the decision to
use ADR.1 2 2 Users of ADR said that ADR provided better outcomes
than litigation (66 percent) and preserved confidentiality and good busi-
ness relationships (59 percent).1 2 3 If ADR is now universally accepted in
international business and, "it is well accepted that mediators can help to
settle disputes, it seem equally well accepted that there is little or no role
for such mediators in helping the parties with commercial transac-
tions. ' ' 124 Therefore, just like ADR once was, deal mediation and cross-
4. Achievement: Personal success through demonstrating competence
according to social standards;
5. Power: Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people
and resources;
6. Security: Safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships,
and of self;
7. Conformity: Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to
upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms;
8. Tradition: Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and
ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self;
9. Benevolence; and
10. Preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one is in
frequent personal contact (the "in-group").
See also Michael H. Hoppe, Culture, Leadership, and Organizations: the GLOBE
Study, available at http://www.inspireimagineinnovate.com/PDF/GLOBEsumma
ry-by-Michael-H-Hoppe.pdf (last visited May 6, 2014) (Culture, Leadership, and
Organizations reports the findings of the first two phases of the ten-year Global
Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) research pro-
gram. GLOBE is a long-term program designed to conceptualize, operationalize,
test, and validate a cross-level integrated theory of the relationship between cul-
ture and societal, organizational, and leadership effectiveness. A team of 160
scholars worked together since 1994 to study societal culture, organizational cul-
ture, and attributes of effective leadership in sixty-two cultures.
121. Johnsen, supra note 52, at 195-96 (2011) (discussing the historical resistance to
ADR in the U.S.). At the international level the emergence of ADR and arbitra-
tion can be easily explained by the New York Convention in 1980 was probably the
main historical and legal factor to explain the development of ADR in interna-
tional commercial disputes.
122. See Darryl Geddes, U.S. Corporations Now Widely Use Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution Over Litigation to Solve Disputes, National Survey Shows, CORNEI-I CIIRON-
ICLE (May 21, 1997), http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/1997/05/survey-also-
finds-lack-confidence-qualifications-arbitrators (a joint initiative of the Institute on
Conflict Resolution at Cornell's School of Industrial and Labor Relations, the
Foundation for the Prevention and Early Resolution of Conflict (PERC) and Price
Waterhouse LLP, polled more than 530 corporations in the Fortune 1,000
category).
123. Id.
124. Peppet, supra note 1, at 288.
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cultural deal mediation are new, cutting-edge concepts that will certainly
have to overcome the conservatism of the American legal profession
before being widely promoted and utilized in dispute resolution. 125
A. ECONOMIC, STRATEGIC BENEFITS OF CROSS-CULTURAL
DEAL MEDIATION
One way to convince the American legal profession is to demonstrate
the economic and strategic advantages of deal mediation and cross-cul-
tural deal mediation.'2 6
1. Discovering and Optimizing Gains from Trade
Bargaining theory teaches us that in a transaction parties often fail to
negotiate strategically in a value-creating manner, cooperative, or inter-
ests-based approach (win-win). 127 Many empirical studies consistently
show that negotiators both seek and provide far less information about
each other's interests and priorities than one might expect. 128 Each side
makes exaggerated offers or demands to hide its true reservation price.
Some cultures have the reputation of always starting with excessive offers
or demands, or keep their reservation price secret. 129 Beyond cultural
preference for high offers or demands, strategic negotiators are known to
always start their negotiations with their Maximum Plausible Possibility
(MPP), strengthen their BATNA, and weakening the other side's
BATNA to capture greater gains.' 30 Therefore, the cross-cultural deal
mediator can mitigate strategic posturing and help negotiating parties to
125. Id. at 362-63 (discussing that the conservative attitude is primarily related to eco-
nomic reasons called the "Agency Barrier." The Agency Barrier means that in
addition to the principals' reluctance to use mediators, lawyers, bankers, brokers,
and other agents that currently assist in transactions may resist mediator assis-
tance. Transactional lawyers may be reluctant to allow a mediator into their nego-
tiations, given that transactional lawyers often pride-and sell-themselves on their
bargaining abilities. Deal mediators can also be viewed as reducing billing hours
of the lawyers. Finally, a lawyer or other agent may fear that a client will turn
exclusively to using a deal mediator, completely eliminating the agent from the
transaction. The second problem explaining the conservative and negative attitude
of American legal profession against deal mediation is the "Fear of Transaction."
Contracting parties may believe that a deal mediator can do little for them that
they can do for themselves and will only increase the cost of the transaction).
126. Id. at 291-321 (discussing economic and strategic justification for deal mediation).
127. Id. at 291-296 (discussing the economic and strategic advantage of deal meditation
is to help the parties discovering gains for trade).
128. Id. at 296.
129. Id. at 292-93.
130. Roy J. LIWICKI, BRUCE BARRY & DAVID M. SUNDERS, NEGOTIATION: READINGS,
EXERCISES AND CASES 98 (5th ed. 2007) (discussing the Secrets of Power Negoti-
ating by Roger Dawson. Following Dawson power negotiating strategy and tactic a
negotiator should always start by his Maximum Plausible Possibility (MPP)-
which is the most you can ask for and still appear credible). See also ADLER, supra
note 29, at 233 (discussing initial offers in international business negotiations. For
instance, Chinese and Russians habitually use extreme initial offers and requests as
their opening bargaining strategy. Also, research show that Americans negotiating
domestically consistently reach higher and more satisfactory outcomes using ex-
treme rather than moderate opening offers).
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work in a more value-creating manner, cooperative, or interested-based
approach (win-win). 131 The cross-cultural mediator can do this by man-
aging the transfer of information. 132
2. Renegotiation
Renegotiations mean the continuing struggle of life against form in in-
ternational business transactions. 133 Negotiation costs time and money.
Therefore, there are always high economic and transactional costs associ-
ated with negotiations. Experienced lawyers and executives know that
the challenge of international business negotiations is not just "Getting to
Yes," but also staying there. 134 The renegotiation of business deals is a
constant and common phenomenon of the international business environ-
ment.' 35 For instance, for Americans, a trustworthy negotiator honors
the contract (American businesspeople will commonly say "A deal is a
deal, a contract is a contract."). In contrast, for the Chinese, a trustwor-
thy negotiator honors changing mutualities. A contract must be capable
of adapting to a changing business relationship. For particularist cultures
like in East Asia, South Asia, Africa, Middle East, Caribbean, or Latin
America, the contract only marks the beginning of a business relation-
ship.136 Therefore, a cross-cultural deal mediator can be useful in three
ways:
1. To balance the universalism (contract-orientation) of Americans
versus the particularism (relationship-oriented or situational-ori-
ented) of foreign cultures;137
2. To manage the renegotiations before the closing of a deal between
the parties by not letting all terms and conditions be entirely renego-
131. See Peppet, supra note 1, at 293.
132. Id.
133. Jeswald W. Salacuse, Renegotiating International Business Transactions: The Con-
tinuing Struggle of Life Against Form, 35 INT'i- LAW. 1507,1507-41 (2001) (discuss-
ing renegotiations in international business transactions).
134. Id. at 1507.
135. Id. at 1508
136. Id.
137. TROMPENAARS & HAMPIDEN-TURNIR, supra note 8, at 29-50 (theorizing and of-
fering empirical comparison between Universalist (rules-oriented) and Particular-
ist (relationship-oriented) business people). American society is based on
Universalism. This means for Americans justice and fairness is embedded in the
contract: a contract ensures that all parties are treated in a transparent, accounta-
ble, and consistent manner (universal justice is based on the contract-a "deal is a
deal"). If a contract is considered to be unfair, an American party will readily
dispute the contract via negotiation/mediation/litigation/arbitration. On the other
hand, justice and fairness does not always reside in the contract for Paticularist
cultures like the Chinese, Arabs, or Latin American business people. They will
instead often seek fairness by treating all cases on their special merits on basis of
relationships (natural justice if preferred over the contract- therefore a deal is sub-
ject to be revisited on basis of the evolution of the relationship and situations).
Particularists are relationship-oriented and situational-oriented, but Americans are
Universalists or right-based and contract-oriented. Americans prefer to avoid or
minimize renegotiations.
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tiated (in other words not letting the deal breakdown at the last min-
ute) and;
3. as the cross-cultural dispute mediator and help the parties resolve
the dispute if they experience a legal dispute in their renegotiations
after a contract with problematic terms and conditions is signed or
negotiations of amendments to an original agreement. The media-
tor will have the advantage of having contributed to the building of
the relationship between the parties, will be familiar with their be-
haviors, and will possess a "corporate memory" of the deal bar-
gained (in other words, the mediator will know the bargaining
history behind each clause of the contract). Therefore, his involve-
ment will help preserve the business relationship established by the
parties by assisting with legal disputes over contractual renegotia-
tions and amendments. 138
The cross-cultural deal mediator can later become the cross-cultural
mediator when the contract is signed and the parties can avoid having a
new mediator starting from zero. All of the parties will save time and
money and can expect better results from mediation.
B. BEHAVIORAL BENEFITS OF DEAL CROSS-CULTURAL MEDIATION
The theoretical and empirical study of behaviors in relation to business
communication and negotiation is usually associated with the academic
discipline of organizational behavior.' 39 Organizational behavior "ex-
plores how mediators can help contracting parties to manage psychologi-
cal, emotional, and relational issues that may impede reaching
agreement."' 40 Humans are not programmed robots and emotions al-
ways play a crucial role in any negotiation or conflict resolution.1 41 They
can have a positive impact if well-managed or a destructive impact if mis-
managed or misinterpreted.1 42 Understanding the behavioral and emo-
tional process of a negotiation is always a complex task. Cultural
138. See Peppet, supra note 1.
139. Ewald, supra note 85. Also, Organizational Behavior can be simply defined like
the study of individuals and their behavior within the context of the organization
in a workplace setting. It is an interdisciplinary field that includes sociology, psy-
chology, communication, and management. Keywords related to Organizational
Behavior are Organizational Change, Organizational Development, Corporate
Culture, Corporate Communication, Group Behavior, and Human Decision Mak-
ing. See Organizational Behavior, CORNELL UNIVERSITY, available at http://www
.ilr.cornell.edu/library/research/subjectguides/organizationalbehavior.htm (last
visited May 6, 2014).
140. See Peppet, supra note 1, at 325.
141. See FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 105, at 3 (explaining emotions in negotiation
and dispute resolution are powerful, always present, and hard to handle. We can-
not stop having emotions any more than we can stop having thoughts. The chal-
lenge is learning to simulate helpful emotions in those with whom we negotiate-
and in ourselves).
142. Id. at 5 (discussing that emotions can be obstacles to negotiation and dispute
resolution).
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differences magnify this complex task.' 43 The behavioral benefits of
cross-cultural deal mediation'" are obvious because negotiators are
humans with feelings, intuitions, fears, and emotion; they are not robots.
Therefore, the cross-cultural mediator helps the parties to overcome the
following behavioral barriers to effective cross-cultural communication,
negotiation and conflict resolution:
Adverse Selection: Adverse selection is a term often used in econom-
ics, risk management and bargaining theory. In bargaining theory, it re-
fers to a negotiation process in which "bad" results occur when the
parties have asymmetric information (i.e., access to different informa-
tion).' 4 5 In bargaining theory and contract theory, information asymme-
try means one party has more or better information than the other. This
creates an imbalance of bargaining power and leads to inefficient and
nondurable contracts. As a result, contractual obligations may not be
performed and, once signed, contracts may be breached often on the ba-
sis of the theory of efficient breach.
Fairness: American negotiators are culturally conditioned to often care
more about fairness and are sometimes willing to "kill a deal" over it. 1 4 6
However, assessments of fairness are often biased and self-serving. 147
The cross-cultural deal mediator may be able to offer a neutral assess-
ment or fair proposal that the parties may be more willing to adopt. 148
Reactive Devaluation: This means the tendency of one party to per-
ceive the offers and demands of the other side as negative or suspicious
by saying, for example, "Something must be wrong." Sometimes it might
143. TROMPENAARS & HAMPDEN-TuRNER, supra note 8, at 70-82 (theorizing and of-
fering empirical comparison between Neutral vs. Affective Cultures). In Neutral
Cultures like United States, emotions negotiators try hard to suppress and not
reveal what they are thinking or feeling-they try to keep a "poker face." Emo-
tional expressiveness is interpreted as a lack of control over your feelings and in-
consistent with high status. In contrast, in Affective Cultures like in Latin
America or Middle East, emotions play an important role in communication be-
cause transparency and expressiveness are expected in all communications.
144. See Peppet, supra note 1, at 325-39 (discussing behavioral justifications for deal
mediation).
145. Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the Res-
olution of Conflict, 8 OH1io ST. J. ON Disp. RESOi. 235, 240 (1993) (discussing un-
reciprocated approaches to creating value leave their maker vulnerable to claiming
tactics. On the other hand, focusing on the distributive aspects of bargaining can
often lead to unnecessary deadlocks and, more fundamentally, a failure to discover
options or alternatives that make both sides better off. A simple example can
expose the dilemma. The first involves what game theorists call "information
asymmetry." This simply means each side to a negotiation characteristically knows
some relevant facts that the other side does not know).
146. The English language of negotiation is based on fairness and reasonableness: as
taught at the Harvard Negotiation Project at Harvard Law School and in princi-
pled negotiation. "English pattern of usage-relying heavily on fairness and rea-
sonableness-influenced] all cultures engaged in international commerce and
legal relations." Therefore, American negotiators are more likely to demand that
the foreign negotiator think in the idiom of reasonableness like them. FLF'rcrIER
& SHEPPARD, supra note 71, at 65.
147. Peppet, supra note 1, at 326.
148. Id. at 329.
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be wise to doubt the other side's offers and demands because the other
side may use false concessions (shadow warriors) or overstate their bot-
tom line (reservation point) or play dirty tricks. 149 The cross-cultural deal
mediator may be able to help offer a more neutral assessment.
Framing and Endowment: Empirical studies in the field of bargaining
theory show that negotiators tend to overvalue items they own, as com-
pared to items they do not. In other words, negotiators demand more to
give up something they already own than they would offer to purchase
that same item. Therefore, a neutral cross-cultural deal mediator is less
susceptible to the framing and endowment effect in the bargaining pro-
cess than a partisan lawyer acting on behalf of his client.150 The price is
not the only issue; the proposed legal terms and conditions to be inserted
in the contract are also often subject to the framing and endowment ef-
fect. 151 This is especially the case when the parties are accustomed to
trying to impose their standard agreement (boilerplate template) on the
other side. Therefore, a cross-cultural deal mediator can help the parties
to work more collaboratively to build a mutually satisfactory contract. 152
Attributions and Emotions: Negotiators make explanatory attributions
(inventing stories about others or circumstances) to understand the nego-
tiation process and seek reasons for offers, demands and behaviors of the
other side. For instance, a negotiator may explain his/her poor perform-
ance and outcome by focusing on the other side's intentional actions (e.g.,
"they tricked me") or circumstances (e.g., there wasn't enough time to
negotiate" or "they were too rich, too powerful" or "their culture is weird
and incompatible with ours"). 153 Sometimes attributions about others
are correct, but often in cross-cultural negotiations they are inaccurate
and biased. Perceptions and interpretations are culturally determined
and can lead to cross-cultural misperceptions and misinterpretations. 154
International business negotiators can easily fall into the trap of cross-
cultural miscategorization based on cultural stereotyping (i.e., using his
own national culture values to make sense of cross-cultural situations or
use descriptive cultural stereotypes of other cultures from his own culture
(e.g., Americans think that Chinese are .... Arabs think that Americans
are .... .).155 Fisher and Shapiro argue that dealing with emotions should
be one of the central focuses of a negotiator or mediator. 156 Emotions
can be obstacles or assets to the negotiation process depending on the
149. Dirty tricks in negotiation may be described as illegal and unethical strategies such
deliberate deception (misrepresentation about facts or phony facts), or ethically
questionable strategies and tactics such misrepresentation of authority, the Good-
Cop and Bad-Cop strategy, imposing calculated delays, silence or refusal to negoti-
ate ("take-it-or-leave-it agreement"), escalating demands, threats, etc.
150. Peppet, supra note 1, at 333.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 334.
154. ADLER, supra note 29, at 77-78 (discussing problems in cross-cultural
communications).
155. Id.
156. FISI-iR & SHAPIRO, supra note 105.
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way they are managed.1 57 Fisher and Shapiro identify five core concerns
that are important to almost every person; in virtually every negotiation:
appreciation, affiliation, autonomy, status, and role. 158
However, each emotion may have a different degree of importance in a
specific culture. For instance, appreciation and affiliation will be more
important for collectivist cultures found in Argentina, China, or Japan. 159
Autonomy will be more important for individualistic cultures like that of
Canada or the United States. 60 Status will be fundamental for high
power distance and ascription-oriented cultures such as those of China,
Japan, or Russia. 1 6 1 The role of hierarchy is often crucial in high power
distance and high uncertainty cultures such as France or Japan. 162 Fur-
thermore, some cultures are affective (expressing emotions) and some
cultures are neutral (repressing emotions) in communications, negotia-
tions, and dispute resolution. 163 For Americans, being rational, fact-ori-
ented, objective, and reasonable is associated with legitimacy.' 64 For
Argentineans, Mexicans, or Haitians, expressing strong emotions is asso-
ciated with conviction and legitimacy. 165 Therefore, a cross-cultural deal
mediator can help the parties interpret their own emotions more accu-
rately (i.e., help them to be more emotionally and culturally intelligent by
improving emotional self-awareness and cultural awareness) and to inter-
pret the emotions of the other side more accurately. Research has shown
that angered negotiators tend to pay less attention to each other's inter-
ests, and find fewer mutually beneficial solutions than those who are not
angry.166 Therefore, the overall job of a cross-cultural deal mediator is to
create positive emotions and leverage an emotional climate for the par-
ties to work cooperatively. Overall, this means a cross-cultural deal me-
diator should be someone with high cultural intelligence (C.I.) and high
emotional intelligence (E.I.) because a recent study conducted at the
multinational Johnson & Johnson Ltd. demonstrated that E.I. competen-
cies can be identified throughout the world, indicating that these abilities
157. Id. at 5-6.
158. Id. at 17 (explaining five core emotional concerns in negotiation and dispute
resolution).
159. HOISTEDE ET AL., supra note 4, at 89-134 (offering an empirical classification and
theoretical comparison between Individualist and Collectivist cultures).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 53-88 (offering an empirical classification and theoretical comparison be-
tween Low Power distance cultures like the American equalitarian society and
High Power Distance society like China, Japan, and Middle Eastern societies).
162. Id. at 187-234 (offering an empirical classification and theoretical comparison be-
tween low uncertainty avoidance culture like the United States and high uncer-
tainty avoidance culture like France or Japan).
163. TROMPENAARS & HAMPDEN-TURNER, supra note 8, at 70-82 (offering an empirical
classification and theoretical comparison between Neutral and Affective Cultures).
See also John Wade, Negotiating With Difficult People, 2 FAULKER L. REV. 221,




166. Peppet, supra note 1, at 335.
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always matter for businesspeople and can be assessed anywhere a com-
pany operates.' 67 This research leads to the conclusion that E.I. abilities
transcend cross-cultural differences, and an emotionally intelligent nego-
tiator or mediator is more likely to be efficient in all negotiations and
mediations. 168
Decision Traps (A.K.A. cognitive heuristics): A decision trap means to
oversimplify complex decision-making. 169 Negotiation is not just about
communication, it is also about leadership and decision-making. To be a
truly effective negotiator a person should possess both great communica-
tion and leadership (decision-making) skills and competencies. Decision-
making in negotiation and mediation is a complex task in U.S. domestic
business transactions, subject to many studies in the field of bargaining
theory.' 70 However, most bargaining and organizational theories in U.S.
scholarship are not aimed to explain or help to improve decision-making
in negotiation in the context of cross-cultural business negotiations. 17'
Despite being a more global world, the majority of bargaining and orga-
nizational theories are "made in the U.S.A." and therefore shaped by the
political, economic, legal, and cultural contexts of the United States.172
Cross-cultural decision-making is even more complex because the stakes
are usually higher and cross-cultural differences often misguide American
negotiators to base their decisions primarily on their own experience at
home and within the national culture. 173 Cross-cultural misinterpreta-
tions and misperceptions cause cross-cultural decision-making to be more
complex and subject to more "shortcuts" and "traps." The most frequent
decision-making shortcuts and traps for cross-cultural negotiators are as
follows: 17 4
I. Anchoring (over-relying on first thoughts);
II. Entrapment (protecting earlier choices);
III. Fixed-pie beliefs such as "I win, you should lose," "You win,
I lose," or, the most popular belief, "Negotiation is always
about losing some and getting some" (negotiators refusing to
create-value for the deal and refusing to perceive the negoti-
ation process as finding mutually-beneficial solutions. Such a
belief leads parties to ignore others' interests and percep-
tions and the fact that negotiation is not always about "losing
167. DANJI- GOLEMAN FT AL., supra note 86, at 37.
168. Wade, supra note 163, at 244.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., Peppet, supra note 1, at 294 (discussing bargaining theory in relation to
dispute resolution and mediation); Avinash Dixit & Barry Nalebuff, Making Strat-
egies Credible, in STRATEGIES AND CHOICE 161 (Richard J. Zeckhauser ed., 1991)
(discussing mediation as a coordination mechanism); Robert H. Gertner & Geof-
frey P. Miller, Settlement Escrows, 24 J. LEGAL STuD. 87, 120-21 (1995) (exploring
how a mediator may serve as an informational escrow to facilitate settlement and
comparing mediation to settlement escrows).
171. ADLER, supra note 29, at 164.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Wade, supra note 163, at 244 (listing and explaining the more frequent decision-
making shortcuts and traps in negotiation and dispute resolution).
CROSS-CULTURAL DEAL MEDIATION
some and getting some," but rather finding workable mutu-
ally-beneficial solutions.);
IV. Status quo;
V. Confirming evidence (seeing what you want to see);
VI. Framing (triggering premature answers with wrong
questions);
VII. Relying on easily available information (e.g., finding some
legal information on a "Wikipedia" without confirming the
validity);
VIII. Winner's curse ("Perhaps we could have done better?" when
you did excellent);
IX. Loser's curse ("We did what we could, this is not great but
satisfactory"-when in reality you did very poor);
X. Dreamer's curse-unrealistic expectations ("We will make it,"
when common sense, probabilities, and facts all say
otherwise);
XI. Over-confidence or optimistic overconfidence trap (negotia-
tor is too sure of his/her knowledge and abilities);
XII. Based-rate trap (relying on exceptions and the law of small
numbers);
XIII. Self-serving bias (environment versus personality);
XIV. Prisoner's dilemma (The prisoner's dilemma emerged from
the Game Theory discipline studied in Bargaining theory.
Empirical studies in Game Theory show that negotiators
might not negotiate on an interests-based (mutually win-win)
approach, even if it appears that it is in their best interest to
do so); and
XV. Agency problems (The role of agents such as lawyers, bank-
ers, brokers, and other agents are all subject to conflict of
interests; therefore, a cross-cultural deal mediator can help
to objectify the bargaining and deal-making process. The
cross-cultural deal mediator can also mitigate the risk of con-
flicts of interests occurring in the transactions by holding
agents accountable for relationships which appear to pose
conflicts of interest(s)).
In sum, in face of decision traps the overall job of a cross-cultural deal
mediator is to mitigate the behavioral barriers to effective communica-
tion, negotiation, and decision-making to allow the parties to negotiate in
a rational, objective, and mutually-beneficial manner. The specific tasks
of the cross-cultural deal mediator are as follows: first, to help the parties
overcome obstacles to generating options and solutions (facilitating the
cross-cultural bargaining and dispute resolution process for the contract
formation (pre-contractual phase) in a more focused interest-based and
right-based manner); second, to help the parties improve cross-cultural
understanding in general by improving cross-cultural communication, ne-
gotiation, dispute resolution, and leadership (decision-making) in the bar-
gaining process; and third, to mediate emotionally charged negotiations
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to insure that the deal is closed in a reasonable amount of time.175
Managing Intra-group Conflicts: Cross-cultural deal mediators can
help with the management of intragroup con?icts in a negotiation team
by effectively channeling the energies, expertise, perceptions, and re-
sources of the group leader and members toward the formulation and
attainment of mutually satisfactory outcomes.
Managing Inter-group Cross-Cultural Conflicts: One of the most basic
forms of categorization is between "us" and "them." Collectivist cultures
in China and Japan have stronger senses of categorization. 176 Cultural
values influence the management of conflicts. Getting to Yes and the in-
terests-based approach to negotiation might be the most popular theory
in U.S. business and law schools, but still negotiations tend to be con-
ducted in a more power-based and rights-based approach.1 77 American
negotiators may think that they are negotiating in an interests-based
manner when in fact they are not: "[e]ven well-intentioned negotiators
often make one or more of three mistakes: failing to negotiate when they
should, negotiating when they should not, or negotiating when they
should but picking an inappropriate strategy that might damage the busi-
ness relationship."' 78 Therefore, cultural values and cross-cultural misin-
terpretations and misperceptions often intensify conflicts between groups
(negotiating teams) from different cultures.
Dealing with Cross-cultural Ethical Problems: The topic of deception
seems important for management and negotiation around the world;
however, there is very little evidence concerning cultural differences and
tendencies to deceive.1 79 Cross-cultural misperceptions and misinterpre-
tations lead to many cross-cultural ethical issues in negotiation. For in-
stance, the practice of gift-giving is something common and expected in
most East-Asian or Middle Eastern business cultures.' 80 Such a practice
175. TROMPENAARS & HAMPIDEN-TURNER, supra note 8, at 143-44 (offering empiricaljustifications that the American "Sequential" culture prefers that the ideal corpo-
rate time orientation for anything (including negotiation) is the straight line and
the most direct, efficient and rapid route to your objectives). See also Peppet,
supra note 1, at 338 (citing Alan K. Wells, Acquisition Intermediaries: Purveyors of
Opportunity, in DIRECI'ORY oiF M&A INrnERM 13ARIES 13, 14 (2001) ("In-
termediaries (mediators) will often ... mediate emotionally charged negotiations
to insure that the deal is closed in a reasonable amount of time.")).
176. HOFSTEIE FT AL., supra note 4, at 89-134 (offering an empirical classification and
theoretical comparison between Individualist and Collectivist cultures).
177. Id. at 155 (offering an empirical classification of the American culture as masculine
and discussing that in masculine societies business people and lawyers (especially
men) should be assertive, ambitious and though.)
178. Roy J. LIWICKI, BiRucE BARRY & DAVID M. SAUNDERS, ESSENTIALS OF NEGOTI-
AION 58 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing strategy and tactics of integrative negotiation
(win-win) or principled negotiation and what makes integrative negotiation differ-
ent and difficult).
179. Harry C. Triandis et al., Culture and Deception in Business Negotiations: A Mul-
tilevel Analysis, 1 INT'! J. CROSS CULTURAL MGMT. 73, 75 (2001).
180. In the United States gift exchange during negotiations is not really culturally and
legally acceptable, more likely to happen after a contract is signed. Gift exchange
during the negotiation process may be perceived as bribery or the exercise of un-
due influence or bribery (depending the monetary value of the gift) under the U.S.
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can lead to legal complications and liabilities for Americans because of
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.' 8' Furthermore, studies show
that people are likely to lie to help save face in important, close relation-
ships. 182 For instance, given the importance of building and maintaining
relationships and saving face in Chinese culture, it is expected that the
propensity to lie may be greater and more adaptive for Chinese negotia-
tors and lawyers.' 8 3 Also, the socio-economic and corruption level of a
country may also be taken in consideration as indirect evidence.' 84
Therefore, a cross-cultural deal mediator will also be able to explain the
cultural and legal aspects of ethics in negotiations to the parties to better
ensure that the negotiation adheres to the highest standards of ethics.
Managing the Fear of Losing Face: Losing face happens in negotiations
when the more diffuse-oriented people perceive something as private be-
ing disclosed publically at the negotiation's table.' 8 5 For example, spe-
cific cultures, like the American culture, accept the sayings: "Do not take
it personally," "This is just business," or "This is the game" and these
sayings are used frequently in negotiations.186 American negotiators and
lawyers are known to be "direct, to the point, purposeful."'' 87 In negotia-
tions with more relationship-oriented and diffuse-oriented people, these
approaches can be perceived as an insult.' 88 In addition, as mentioned
previously, researchers show that people are likely to lie to help save face
in important, close relationships.' 89 Therefore, the role of cross-cultural
deal mediator can also be to help the parties to save face. Without saving
face, the prospective of reaching agreements will simply fail. To make a
party lose face is often a deal-breaker in international business transac-
tions. Therefore, one of the core responsibilities of a cross-cultural deal
mediator is to help American negotiators and lawyers from more specific
cultures to negotiate by preserving face and maintaining relationships.
Conclusion on Behavioral Benefits of Cross-Cultural Deal Mediation:
In summary, cross-cultural deal mediation provides the need for cross-
cultural negotiation coaching, the need for process management, and
Foreign Corruption Act. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1977).
Gift exchange is a culturally and legally accepted practice in China. Moreover, gift
exchange is expected as part of the natural formation of a contractual relationship.
Chinese view gift-giving as an investment in "social capital." Yunxia Zhu, Pieter
Nel & Ravi Bhat, A Cross Cultural Study of Communication Strategies for Building
Relationships, 6 INT'L J. CROSS CULTURAL MGMT. 319, 321 (2006) (discussing the
concept of social capital as an investment in social relations with expected returns
in the marketplace).
181. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1977).
182. Harry C. Triandis et al., supra note 179, at 75.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 75 (discussing how socio-economic conditions such as social poverty cause
people to compromise ethical values and act desperately in the negotiation process
or in business in general).
185. TROMPEINAARS & HAMI'DEN-TuRNER, supra note 8, at 88
186. Id.
187. Id. at 100-03.
188. Id. at 88.
189. Harry C. Triandis et al., supra note 179, at 75.
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helps to build and maintain relationships.' 90 The mediator also manages
conflicts during the bargaining process (in joint sessions or caucusing me-
diation sessions) and offers a platform for apology and forgiveness to
build and maintain a good relationship between the parties. 191
V. WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH CROSS-
CULTURAL DEAL MEDIATION
The main three problems are as follows:
1. American business and legal culture
As mentioned previously, the first obstacle of cross-cultural deal medi-
ation will be cultural: the conservatism of the American business and le-
gal profession, 192  the emphasis on individualism, and masculine
orientation of their business culture.' 93 In addition, culturally-unlike
Latin Americans, Arabs, or East Asians-Americans prefer fast-paced
negotiations.' 94 Therefore, cross-cultural deal mediation may be viewed
as an unnecessary costly and time-consuming additional step.
2. Mediator. mediators are not omnipotent, neither are they perfects
The second obstacle is related to the mediators itself. As explained by
Scott R. Peppet, deal mediation can be affected first by "[t]he problem of
'gaming the mediator"' and "[t]he problem of self-interested transac-
tional mediators,"'195 and second, by the integrity of the mediator and
potential conflict of interests. First, what does "the problem of gaming
190. David A. Hoffman, Mediation and the Art of Shuttle Diplomacy, 27 NEGOTIATION
J. 263, 286 (2011) (discussing the literature of mediation is replete with cases in
which obtaining an apology satisfied all or nearly all of a party's objectives in the
case and thus paved the way to resolution. Mediation creates a unique opportu-
nity for apologies because of the confidentiality of the process. An apology
presented in a joint mediation session, spontaneously and unrehearsed, can dra-
matically shift the negotiation in the direction of settlement).
191. Id. at 302 (discussing the advantage of caucusing versus joint-sessions in relation-
ship-building or restoring process in mediation. If the mediator has developed a
rapport with each side, these caucus conversations can be conducted in a non-
adversarial manner, with the mediator trying to look at the strengths and weak-
nesses of each side's case from the vantage point of the party with whom the medi-
ator is meeting and trying to develop a trusting relationship. Such conversations
can also explore nonmonetary interests and integrative, "expand the pie" solu-
tions-perhaps exploring options that would not be shared in a joint session. The
fundamental point, however, is that the parties and their counsel generally prefer
to engage in both reality testing and the exploration of broader interests in private
sessions in which they can be more candid with the mediator, and the mediator can
be more candid with them).
192. See Peppet, supra note 1, at 293.
193. See HOIFSTEDE, ET AL., supra note 4; Salacuse, supra note 6; O'Neil, supra note 30;
Strum, supra note 31; Triandis et al., supra note 179.
194. TROMPENAARS & HAMPDFN-TURNER, supra note 8, at 143-44 (offering an empiri-
cal classification and theoretical comparison between Sequential culture like the
United States where time is money (i.e. sizeable and measurable) and Synchronic
cultures like in African or Latin America where time is subordinate to relation-
ship-building).
195. Peppet, supra note 1, at 321-23 (discussing the problem of "gaming the
mediator").
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the mediator" mean and how can you mitigate this problem? Following
Peppet, "[t]he first problem is simple: just as parties try to manipulate
each other, they will try to manipulate a mediator for their own advan-
tage, thereby eliminating or greatly reducing the mediator's ability to
help parties overcome information asymmetries or adverse selection.
1' 96
In other words, mediators do not possess special powers and cannot read
the minds of the parties. They are not omnipotent; they cannot command
the "full disclosure or expect that parties will drop strategic ambitions
merely because a mediator is polite or friendly."1 97 There is no miracle
remedy against manipulation of the parties; again, mediators are not om-
nipotent superheroes. However, they should be sufficiently experienced
to see through manipulation. 198 A simple strategy to overcome manipu-
lation for a cross-cultural deal mediator should be to take notes of all of
the statements and promises that the parties made during the negotiation,
and draft a detailed Representations and Warranties clause.' 99 Such a
clause will contain all the representations and warranties made during the
negotiation. The cross-cultural deal mediator will also include the repre-
sentations and warranties that were omitted and the representations and
warranties that he thinks that should have been discussed. This strategy
will help to hold the parties accountable and transparent during the con-
tract negotiation process. As Peppet states, "a mediator does not need
perfect information to add value. Even if a mediator learns only a frac-
tion of the truth, the mediator may be able to prevent unnecessary dead-
lock, or help the parties to find value-creating terms .... -2o0 Second,
deal mediation can be affected by the integrity of the mediator and po-
tential conflict of interests. Following Peppet, "the problem of self-inter-
ested transactional mediators" means "[j]ust as mediators are not
omnipotent, neither are they perfect;" a mediator may act on her own
interests rather than the parties.201 A cross-cultural deal mediator may
be driven:
196. Id. at 321
197. Id.
198. See also John Barkai, Teaching Negotiation and ADR: The Savvy Samurai Meets
The Devil, 75 NEB. L. REv. 704, 704-43 (1996) (discussing negotiation is not just a
lawyering skill. Negotiation is a life skill. Negotiation and conflict resolution often
have elements of battle. The author proposes the negotiator or mediator should
be ready to face any situations, including perilous ones like the savvy Samurai. For
instance, they need to protect against weapons of war or simply the abuse of sting-
ing words. Like the Samurai negotiator and mediator need to be able to employ
all their weapons. A Samurai's mediator is both skilled at the art of negotiating
and convincing but also at the art of knowing-i.e. questioning and active
listening.)
199. Peppet, supra note 1, at 285 (discussing that business lawyer can use representa-
tions, warranties, and other contractual devices to bring the real world's imperfect
market closer to the idealized world of efficient markets). The deal mediator can
do the same thing by proposing certain representations or warranties.
200. Id. at 322.
201. Peppet, supra note 1, at 323.
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" To close deals to build a reputation based on his success at closing
deals (businesspeople and lawyers will search for a deal mediator
that has a history of helping the parties closing a deal); and
" To close deals to get a percentage of the transaction if the deal is
closed (flat fee based on success of the transaction instead of billing
per hour).
However, we all know not all deals should be closed. 20 2 Businesspe-
ople and lawyers should look at a cross-cultural deal mediator not for his
ability to close international deals, but his ability to build efficient and
durable contracts and business relationships. If a mediator or arbitrator
wishes to preserve his/her reputation, he must strive to the highest stan-
dards of competency: impartiality. Paying the cross-cultural deal media-
tor on the basis of the success of the transaction may affect his
impartiality, neutrality, and independence. 203 The potential for conflicts
of interests will be greater.204 Therefore, flat fees should be avoided and
the cross-cultural mediator should be billed for his services on a per-hour
basis (with a cap, if the parties prefer).
3. Cost of Cross-cultural Deal Mediation: may be viewed as an unnec-
essary additional to the transaction
Most importantly, the last problem is the cost of cross-cultural deal me-
diation. In the business world, "money talks" and cross-cultural deal me-
diation will be viewed as an additional and unnecessary cost to the
transaction. Businesspeople, especially at the international level, often
view business lawyers as an annoying transactional costs or a necessary
evil:
Business lawyers are seen at best as a transaction cost, part of a sys-
tem of wealth redistribution from clients to lawyers; legal fees re-
present a tax on business transactions to provide an income
maintenance program for lawyers. At worst, lawyers are seen as deal
killers whose continual raising of obstacles, without commensurate
effort at finding solutions, ultimately causes transactions to collapse
under their own weight.20 5
This analysis leads us to two questions. First, why will international
businesspeople want to have more lawyers involved in the deal-making
process? The answer is simple: a cross-cultural deal mediator is not act-
ing as a lawyer, but first and foremost as a mediator. Almost all relation-
ship-oriented business cultures such as China and Japan have a positive
202. Id. at 323. See also Ron S. Fortgang et al., Negotiating The Spirit Of The Deal,
HARVARD Bus. REv., Feb. 1, 2003, at 66 (discussing the problem of intermediaries
seeking to push a deal through despite obvious indicators that the deal should not
close).
203. Peppet, supra note 1, at 357-58.
204. Id.
205. Fleischer, supra note 3, at 487 (quoting Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Busi-
ness Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YAu_ L.J. 239, 241-42 (1984)).
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opinion of mediators.20 6 Secondly, why will the lawyers of businesspe-
ople let a deal mediator intervene if they know that they are already
viewed as too expensive? In other words, the deal mediator may present
a serious threat to the services of the lawyers, after all a deal mediator's
job is to facilitate the negotiations; this means lower billing possibilities
for the lawyers! Wise businesspeople are usually smart enough to see
when their lawyers do not put the clients' best interests first. In other
words, having a business lawyer thinking of your best long-term interests
is fundamental. I once asked Jay C. Kellerman, an internationally
respected senior partner leading the global mining group at a top Cana-
dian firm Stikeman Elliott LLP in Toronto,20 7 what his secret to being
successful was. He responded: "as a business lawyer you only need a few
clients, I know my clients very well, they are my friends, I know their
families, and most importantly they trust me." Trust is everything in our
legal profession. Therefore, I think wise business lawyers thinking in
terms of long-term relationship with their clients should see cross-cultural
deal mediation as a way to make their clients happy.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, skeptical readers may say that my overall argument and
analysis in favor of cross-cultural deal mediation in international business
transactions may present symptoms of "optimistic overconfidence" as
studied in this article.20 8 I could not agree more because as a cynical
lawyer, I often paraphrase the quote of the famous Hollywood actor, Tom
Hanks: "I understand the concept of optimism. But I think with me what
you get is a lack of cynicism." But in the face of globalization, my idea
for the emergence of cross-cultural deal mediation as a new ADR
method for international business transactions has not emerged from op-
timism. Instead, my idea emerged from skepticism and cynicism towards
the traditional way of drafting and negotiating international business con-
tracts considering the high rate of failure for the formation of efficient
and durable cross-cultural business contracts. 20 9 Like Voltaire once said,
"optimism is the madness of insisting that all is well when we are
miserable."
206. ZWEIGERT & KOi'z, supra note 45, at 302.
207. See Jay C. Kellerman, STIKEMAN EwIo-vr, http://www.stikeman.com/cps/rde/xchg/
se-en/hs.xsl/Profile.htm?ProfilelD=16002 (last visited May 6, 2014) (Senior Partner
and Head of the Global Mining Group in Toronto).
208. Peppet, supra note 1, at 361-62 (discussing the barrier to entry to deal mediation
called "Optimistic Overconfidence").
209. See Bing, Gitelson & Laroche, supra note 12; Schweiger & Goulet, supra note 13.
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